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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff brought this action to foreclose a mechanic's 
lien for painting labor and supplies furnished to the home of 
defendant Debra L. Youngman. (Record at 2-8). Plaintiff 
commenced his work in June 1988 and completed his work August 
30, 1988. (Record at 79). In July 1988 Ameristar Financial 
Corporation (hereinafter "Ameristar") loaned defendant Youngman 
the sum of $320,000.00 to refinance existing encumbrances 
against defendant Youngman's home, which encumbrances predated 
plaintiff's first work. (Record at 98-101). Defendant 
Security Pacific is a successor-in-interest, through 
assignment, to Ameristar. (Record at 102-103). Defendant 
Security Pacific vigorously defended plaintiff's mechanic's 
lien action on grounds that defendant Security Pacific was 
subrogated to the position of the encumbrances satisfied by 
funds advanced by Ameristar at the request of defendant 
Youngman, and that defendant Security Pacific had priority over 
the mechanic1s lien of plaintiff to the extent of the 
encumbrances so paid. 
Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff initiated this action to foreclose his 
mechanic's lien by filing a complaint in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on August 
2 
15, 1989. Plaintiff named as defendants Debra L. Youngman, 
Deborah Diamanti, Ameristar Financial Corporation and 
Associates Financial Services Company, Inc. (Record at 2). 
On or about February 1, 1990, plaintiff moved for summary 
judgment against defendant Debra L. Youngman and requested a 
default judgment against all other named defendants except 
defendant Diamanti. (Record at 31). That motion was 
unopposed. On May 8, 1990, the court signed a summary judgment 
and a decree of foreclosure in favor of plaintiff and against 
defendants Debra L. Youngman, Ameristar Financial Corporation 
and Associates Financial Services Company, Inc. (Record at 75). 
Thereafter, on June 25, 1990, on motion of plaintiff, the 
court entered an order authorizing plaintiff to amend his 
complaint to name Security Pacific and First Boston Mortgage 
Securities Corporation (hereinafter "First Boston") as 
additional parties defendant. (Record at 65). Defendant 
Security Pacific filed an answer to plaintiff's amended 
complaint on July 16, 1990. (Record at 67). Plaintiff's 
complaint was not served on First Boston and said defendant did 
not make an appearance. The interest of First Boston had been 
assigned to Security Pacific on October 15, 1988. (Record at 
103). 
On March 11, 1991, plaintiff filed a motion for summary 
judgment against defendants First Boston and Security Pacific. 
On or about March 25, 1991 defendant Security Pacific filed a 
cross motion for summary judgment. The facts stated in both 
3 
motions were undisputed and on May 13, 1991 the court entered 
its minute entry granting plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment and denying defendant Security Pacific's motion for 
summary judgment. (Record at 261). The court entered its 
order with respect to the motions for summary judgment on 
August 20, 1991 and an amended judgment and decree of 
foreclosure was also entered on August 20, 1991. (Record at 
298-302). 
The court entered its final order on December 2, 1991 by 
dismissing plaintiff's complaint without prejudice as against 
defendant Deborah Diamanti. (Record at 310). Defendant 
Security Pacific's notice of appeal was filed in the district 
court on December 9, 1991. (Record at 318). 
Statement of Facts 
(See Appendix, Exhibit 1) 
1. Or or about May 15, 1985, defendant Debra Youngman 
entered into a uniform real estate contract for the purchase of 
real property located at 983 East 3rd Avenue, Salt Lake City, 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah and more particularly described 
as follows: 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, Block 27, 
Plat "G", Salt Lake City Survey, and running thence West 
135 ft; thence North 130 ft; thence East 135 ft; thence 
South 130 feet to the point of beginning. 
A non-exclusive easement for ingress and egress over and 
across the following: Alley-way 16 feet wide adjoining 
said land on the North. Situated in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
(Record at 97, 112). 
2. Defendant Youngman purchased the property from 
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Lafayette Properties, Inc., a Utah Corporation, for the sum of 
$420,000.00. (Record at 97, 112). 
3. Defendant Youngman paid the sum of $25,000.00 at the 
time of closing and contracted to make annual payments of 
$25,000.00 plus accrued interest thereafter until May 15, 1989 
at which time the entire unpaid principal balance and accrued 
interest was to be due and payable. (Record at 113). 
4. At the time defendant Youngman purchased the aforesaid 
property, it was subject to the following encumbrances, each of 
which was reflected in the records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder: 
a. A deed of trust dated March 1, 1985 and recorded 
April 25, 1985 as Entry No. 4078404 in Book 5648, Page 2333, in 
the amount of $95,000.00 in favor of Joseph Bunce as 
beneficiary. (Record at 98, 127). 
b. A deed of trust dated April 15, 1985 and recorded 
April 25, 1985 as Entry No. 4078405 in Book 5648, Page 2334, in 
the amount of $4,130.00 in favor of Jacob Tal as beneficiary. 
(Record at 98, 128). 
c. A deed of trust dated April 22, 1985 and recorded 
April 25, 1985 as Entry No. 4078406 in Book 5648, Page 2336, in 
the amount of $40,000.00 in favor of Zella Jeanne Jensen as 
beneficiary. (Record at 99, 131). 
d. An all-inclusive deed of trust dated April 15, 1985 
and recorded April 25, 1985 as Entry No. 4078408 in Book 5648, 
at Page 2340, in the amount of $284,239.80, in favor of Gail 
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Zscheile as beneficiary. (Record at 99, 134). 
5. On or about June 13, 1988, defendant Youngman applied 
for a loan from Ameristar Financial Corporation ("Ameristar"), 
to refinance her obligations under the aforesaid uniform real 
estate contract. (Record at 99-100, 151-152, 212-213). 
6. Between June 13, 1988 and July 1, 1988, the following 
documents were completed and submitted to Ameristar as part of 
the underwriter's approval process: 
a. A residential loan application (Fannie Mae form 
1003, rev. 10/86) executed by defendant Youngman on June 13, 
1988. (Record at 212-213). (Appendix Exhibit 6). 
b. An affidavit and agreement (Fannie Mae form 1009, 
rev. 8/86) executed by defendant Youngman on July 1, 1988. 
(Record at 214-215). (Appendix Exhibit 6). 
c. A transmittal summary (Fannie Mae form 1008, rev. 
10/85) dated June 28, 1988 prepared by Ameristar underwriter 
Angela K. Garza. (Record at 208, 216). (Appendix Exhibit 6). 
d. A loan status and conditions summary dated June 28, 
1988 signed by Angela K. Garza, underwriter. (Record at 209, 
221). (Appendix Exhibit 6). 
e. Lender's closing instructions to U.S. Title of Utah 
dated July 1, 1988 prepared by Ginger Sickler, loan closer for 
Ameristar. (Record at 100, 147-152, 217-220). 
7. The aforesaid uniform real estate contract was 
recorded on June 29, 1988 as Entry No. 4643837 in Book 6043 at 
page 347 in the official records of the Salt Lake County 
6 
Recorder. (Record at 101,112). 
8. On July 7, 1988 the loan from Ameristar to defendant 
Youngman was closed. As part of that loan closing, Lafayette 
Properties conveyed fee title to defendant Youngman by warranty 
deed recorded July 7, 1988 as Entry No. 4647261 in Book 6045 at 
page 979 in the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Recorder. (Record at 101,172). 
9. The total amount loaned by Ameristar to defendant 
Youngman was $320,000.00. Of that amount, the sum of 
$303,545.95 was disbursed to payoff all obligations reflected 
by recorded encumbrances against the subject property. The 
disbursements were made by U.S. Title Company on July 7, 1988, 
as follows: 
a. Joseph Bunce - $86,414.00, check no. 2265 
(Record at 177, 183). 
b. Jacob Tal - $1,615.95, check no. 2266 
(Record at 180, 186). 
c. Zella Jeanne Jensen - $10,000.00, check no. 2267 
(Record at 179, 185). 
d. Lafayette Properties - $53,546.00, check no. 2268 
(Record at 178, 184). 
e. Gail Zscheile - $151,970.05, check no. 2269 
(Record at 176, 182). 
(Record at 101, 154-159). 
10. None of the loan proceeds were distributed to 
defendant Youngman. The balance of the loan proceeds was 
applied toward closing costs. In fact, the aforesaid 
disbursements and closing costs exceeded $320,000.00, the 
amount of the loan. (Record at 145, 218, 220). 
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11. As security for the loan to defendant Youngman, 
Ameristar received a trust deed in the amount of $320,000.00 
which was recorded on July 7, 1988 as Entry No. 4647262 in Book 
6045 at page 980 in the official records of the Salt Lake 
County Recorder. (Record at 102, 187-193). 
12. On July 22, 1988, deeds of reconveyance were recorded 
with respect to the aforedescribed trust deeds in favor of 
Joseph Bunce, Jacob Tal, Zella Jeanne Jensen and Gail 
Zscheile. (Record at 102, 194-197). 
13. In June 1988, plaintiff entered into a contract with 
defendant Youngman to provide painting labor and materials to 
defendant Youngmanfs home. Plaintiff commenced work upon the 
subject property sometime prior to June 29, 1988. (Record at 
36, 99). 
14. Defendant Youngman paid plaintiff the sum of 
$4,000.00 for painting labor and materials supplied by 
plaintiff. (Record at 36). 
15. Plaintiff completed his work on August 30, 1988 and 
filed a notice of lien on November 16, 1988, recorded as Entry 
No. 4702325 in Book 6081 at page 2039 in the official records 
of the Salt Lake County Recorder. (Record at 36, 39, 198-200). 
16. At the time plaintiff commenced his work, the 
property was subject to encumbrances which totaled $303,545.95. 
(Record at 98-99, 101, 127-131). 
17. In applying for the loan from Ameristar, defendant 
Youngman stated that the purpose of the loan was to consolidate 
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existing obligations at a lower interest rate and agreed that 
the loan would be secured by a first deed of trust against the 
subject property. (Record at 100, 151-152, 212-213). 
18. On July 1, 1988, defendant Youngman signed an 
affidavit and agreement that she had not given or permitted or 
contracted to give or permit any lien upon the property to 
secure a debt or loan, except in connection with financing 
subordinate to Ameristar. (Record at 100, 149-150, 214-215). 
19. It was the expectation of Ameristar, based upon the 
representations of defendant Youngman, that Ameristar would 
have a first lien as security for the loan to defendant 
Youngman. It was the policy of Ameristar not to make loans 
which were not secured by first liens. (Record at 168-171, 
205-209, 212, 213). 
20. The loan status and conditions statement prepared by 
Angela K. Garza, underwriter for Ameristar, reflects that 
Ameristar anticipated that the security for the loan would be a 
first mortgage on the subject property and that there would be 
no cash given back to the borrower. Similarly, the transmittal 
summary prepared by Angela Garza reflects that the loan was to 
be secured by a first mortgage and that the loan was to 
refinance existing loans against the subject property. (Record 
at 170-171, 208-209). 
21. On October 15, 1988 Ameristar assigned its deed of 
trust to First Boston. On October 15, 1988, First Boston 
assigned the deed of trust to defendant Security Pacific. 
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(Record at 102-103, 201, 202). 
22. Defendant Youngman defaulted under the terms of her 
trust deed note with Ameristar, and defendant Security Pacific, 
successor-in-interest to Ameristar, proceeded with a 
nonjudicial foreclosure of the deed of trust by trustee's sale 
in July 1990. (Record at 247-248). 
23. Defendant Security Pacific was the successful bidder 
at the trustee's sale, bidding an amount less than the 
outstanding encumbrances paid by the proceeds of the loan from 
Ameristar, which bid was approximately $230,000.00. (Record at 
248). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant Security Pacific seeks to have this court 
reverse the summary judgment entered by the trial court 
granting priority to plaintiff's mechanic's lien over the trust 
deed of defendant Security Pacific. While it is undisputed 
that the trust deed of defendant's predecessor-in-interest, 
Ameristar, was recorded subsequent to the time plaintiff 
commenced to furnish painting labor and materials to the 
subject property, under the principle of equitable subrogation, 
Ameristar is treated as an assignee of the encumbrances 
satisfied from the funds advanced by Ameristar. Martin v. 
Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 150, 59 P.2d 1139 (1936). Those 
encumbrances were recorded threo years prior to the time 
plaintiff's mechanic's lien attached. 
The doctrine of equitable subrogation is applied in 
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instances where a third party pays the debt of another under an 
agreement, express or implied, that the third party will be 
subrogated to or receive security equal to that of the original 
creditor. It was recognized by the Utah Supreme Court as early 
as 1897 in Johnson v. Tootle, 14 Utah 482, 47 P. 1033 (1897) 
and George v. Butler, 16 Utah 111, 50 P. 1032 (1897). Since 
that time this court has played a major role in the development 
of the doctrine of equitable subrogation. Martin v. 
Hickenlooper, supra, is a leading case which has been cited and 
relied upon by many other jurisdictions. It is the principal 
case in an ALR Annotation treating the subject of subrogation 
and has been repeatc^dly cited as authority in real property 
treatises. In Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra, and subsequent 
Utah cases, this court has taken a liberal approach to the 
application of equitable subrogation, recognizing it as "a 
wholesome and meritorious doctrine" which "is now highly 
favored in equity." 59 P.2d at 1140. 
This court has applied equitable subrogation to give 
priority to later recorded trust deeds or mortgages over 
intervening (1) mortgages, (2) judgment liens, (3) equitable 
liens and (4) fee-title interests. The related principle of 
renewal mortgage has likewise been applied by this court to 
grant priority to later recorded trust deeds or mortgages over 
intervening judgment liens and this court has acknowledged its 
potential application vis-a-vis an intervening mechanic's lien. 
To provide protection to those who enhance the value of 
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property by supplying labor or materials, the Utah mechanic's 
lien statutes are construed broadly. Accordingly, labor and 
material suppliers are allowed to base their lien priority on 
the commencement of an improvement to the property. Even so, 
mechanic's liens are still subject to whatever liens are of 
record at the time work is commenced on the property. 
Equitable subrogation treats the satisfaction of a prior 
mortgage by a third party as an assignment of the prior 
mortgage to the third party. Intervening mechanic's lien 
claimants are left in the same position they would have 
occupied had the earlier encumbrance not been satisfied. This 
view is consistent with Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-5. 
The later mortgage is treated as an assignment of the earlier 
mortgage, attaching as of the recordation of the earlier 
mortgage, and not as a mortgage attaching subsequent to the 
commencement of work upon the property. 
The cases which have addressed the application of 
equitable subrogation vis-a-vis an intervening mechanic's lien, 
have not distinguished the equities of a mechanic's lien 
claimant from those of any other type of intervening lien 
claimant. Cases which have denied subrogation to a later 
lender as against an intervening mechanic's lien claimant, have 
done so not because of the nature of the mechanic's lien, but 
because the facts of the cases did not justify the application 
of equitable subrogation. Similarly, the cases which have 
applied equitable subrogation as against an intervening 
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mechnanic's lien claimant have not differentiated a mechanic's 
lien from any other lien. 
The facts of this case compel the application of equitable 
subrogation in favor of defendant Security Pacific. Had 
defendant Youngman not refinanced the encumbrances against her 
home, plaintiff's lien would have been junior to outstanding 
encumbrances in excess of $300,000.00. He did not provide 
painting labor and materials with the expectation of being 
entitled to a first lien on the property to secure the payment 
of his bill. On the* other hand, Ameristar advanced funds upon 
assurances from def€$ndant Youngman that Ameristar would have a 
first lien against the subject property to secure its loan of 
$320,000.00. 
The proceeds of the loan from Ameristar went directly to 
satisfy the outstanding encumbrances against the property in 
the amount of $303,545.95. The balance of the loan was applied 
to closing costs. None of the loan proceeds were paid directly 
to defendant Youngman. The expectation of Ameristar was that 
it would have a first lien to secure its loan. 
Because equitable subrogation is based upon an express or 
implied agreement and has as its objective complete and 
substantial justice among the parties, any negligence on the 
part of the lender invoking subrogation is not important unless 
that negligence rises to the level of culpable or gross 
negligence such as to shift the equities in favor of the 
intervening lien claimant. Ordinary negligence is not 
13 
sufficient to bar equitable subrogation. Assuming, arguendo, 
that Ameristar did not take notice of the painting labor and 
materials supplied to the subject property by plaintiff, that 
fact, under the authorities, does not preclude the application 
of equitable subrogation, particularly in light of the fact 
that plaintiff was charged with notice of the existing 
encumbrances against the property. 
Accordingly, the trust deed of Ameristar, which was 
assigned to defendant Security Pacific, should be subrogated to 
the position of the encumbrances paid by the funds advanced by 
Ameristar to the extent of $303,545.95 plus accrued interest. 
The mechanic's lien of plaintiff is junior to that amount, but 
is senior to the balance of the funds advanced by Ameristar. 
By reason of the fact that the successful bid at the Trustee's 
sale in July 1990 was less than the amount to which defendant 
Security Pacific was subrogated, the mechanic's lien of 
plaintiff became extinguished by that sale. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
FOR NEARLY A CENTURY THIS COURT HAS RECOGNIZED EQUITABLE 
SUBROGATION AS A WHOLESOME AND MERITORIOUS DOCTRINE AND 
HAS AFFORDED IT LIBERAL APPLICATION. 
Subrogation originated in and was borrowed from Roman 
Law.1 More recently, the doctrine appeared in eighteenth 
1
 4 American Law of Property, section 16.145 (A.J. Casner ed. 
1952). 
14 
century France and its modern development draws on the civil 
law of that period.2 It is closely related to the constructive 
trust, nonconsensual equitable lien,3 suretyship and 
restitution.4 
Below follows a discussion of the Utah cases which have 
discussed the related doctrines5 of equitable subrogation and 
renewal mortgage.^ The cases and the theories present two 
dominant themes. First, under circumstances in which a lien or 
interest of a third party has unknowingly intervened, money is 
lent or paid upon an understanding that the money shall be used 
to satisfy or acquire an interest superior to that of the 
intervener's, or is advanced as a continuation of a prior 
debt. Secondly, in those circumstances in which application of 
the doctrines is appropriate the person or entity advancing the 
funds is afforded a priority ov t the intervenor for the reason 
that application of the doctrine does not materially impact the 
2
 i d . 
3 Id. 
^ G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, 2nd 
Edition 1985, p. 706. 
5
 American Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Helgensen, 12 P. 26 at 
27 (Wash 1917). 
6 In addition to the two principal doctrines discussed, the 
doctrines of purchase money mortgage, Nelson v. Stoker, 669 
P.2d 390 (Utah 1983) and that of a vendor's security interest, 
Butler v. Williamson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987) may afford 
priority over intervening or pre-existing liens. 
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position of the intervenor.' 
A. Early Utah Cases Recognize The Equitable Doctrines Of 
Subrogation And Renewal Mortgage In Establishing The 
Priorities Of Competing Interests In Real Property. 
The origins of the doctrines in Utah appear to be found in 
in Johnson v. Tootle, 14 Utah 482, 47 P. 1034 (1897) where this 
court applied subrogation under facts in which an owner of a 
property subject to a trust deed had a judgment entered against 
him. Subsequent to the entry of the judgment, the owners sold 
the property. Under the terms of the sale the purchaser agreed 
to pay off the preexisting trust deed based upon 
representations that it was the only encumbrance against the 
property. Without knowledge of the intervening judgment lien, 
the purchaser paid the obligation secured by the prior trust 
deed and it was reconveyed. 
In affirming the trial court's subrogation of the 
purchaser to the position of the prior trust deed, this court 
noted that the deed of trust was a valid lien upon the property 
in question and that the intervening judgment was subject to 
that lien, that the respondent purchased the land in good faith 
relying upon the representation that the deed of trust was the 
only encumbrance upon the land and that the purchaser was "in 
utter ignorance" of the judgment. The court stated: 
The general principle which runs through nearly all cases 
7
 Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 1139, 1151 (Utah 1936). 
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of this character is that "when the legal rights of the 
parties have been changed by mistake, equity restores them 
to their former condition, when it can be done without 
interfering with any new right acquired on the faith and 
strength of the altered condition of the legal rights, and 
without doing injustice to other persons." To apply this 
principle in this case is to prevent manifest injustice 
and hardship and its application will interfere with no 
superior intervening equities. (Citation omitted; 
quotation in original.) 
47 P. at 1034. 
George v. Butler, 16 Utah 111, 50 P. 1032 (Utah 1897), was 
a case in which the defendant Butler, a lessee under a 25 year 
lease describing Lot 6 Block 57, borrowed $2,500.00 in 1890 
from the Pacific Investment Company and secured that loan with 
an assignment of the lease. Subsequently, in 1891 Butler 
borrowed $1,000.00 from plaintiff George and secured that 
obligation by giving a mortgage on the property described in 
the lease. The 1891 mortgage, however, misdescribed the 
security as Lot 5 in Block 57 instead of Lot 6. Approximately 
two years later, in 1893 Butler borrowed an additional 
$1,000.00 from the investment company and the investment 
company took a deed of trust in the amount of $3,500.00 on the 
same premises to secure the $1,000.00 note as well as the 
$2,500.00 note. At the time of this loan the officers and 
agents of the investment company did not have actual notice of 
plaintiff's mortgage. Two years subsequent to this loan in 
1895, Butler borrowed $3,500.00 from one Sutherland for the 
express purpose of paying his indebtedness to the investment 
company. Sutherland was granted a mortgage on Lot 6 to secure 
the loan to Butler and the proceeds from the Sutherland loan 
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actually paid the obligations owed the investment company. The 
notes were endorsed "paid" and all documents were delivered to 
Sutherland. At the time of this loan, Sutherland had no actual 
knowledge of the loan to George and the abstract of title upon 
which he relied did not make any reference to it. 
George commenced an action to reform and foreclose his 
mortgage, naming Sutherland as a party defendant. The trial 
court, by its decree, subrogated Sutherland to Pacific 
Investment's first lien position on the mortgaged premises and 
directed that he should be paid first to the extent of the 
$2,500.00 and interest thereon. In affirming the subrogation 
of Sutherland to the lien of Pacific Investment Company this 
court appears to have applied both equitable subrogation as 
well as the renewal mortgage doctrine. With regard to the 
$1,000.00 loan from Pacific Investment in 1893, the court said: 
The assignment and delivery of the lease by Butler, on 
November 1, 1890, to Pacific Investment Company, as a 
pledge to secure the $2,500.00 borrowed of the company on 
that day, created a lien upon the property described in 
favor of the company, and ... including that note in the 
trust deed of February 1, 1893, without actual knowledge 
of the mortgage [to plaintiff] ..., did not abrogate the 
lien created by the pledge, for the reason that the 
company did not know of the mortgage to the plaintiff, and 
its agents understood they were acquiring the first lien 
by the deed of trust; and the plaintiff was not prejudiced 
by including the $2,500.00 in the trust deed. 
50 P. at 1034. 
With respect to the transaction in which Sutherland loaned 
$3,500.00 to pay off the liens upon the property, the court 
noted that Sutherland loaned his money to the owner of the 
leasehold estate for the purpose of paying off the lien held by 
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the Pacific Investment Company, believing and expecting that he 
would get the same security as that he had satisfied, but 
afterward learned of the $1,000.00 mortgage held by the 
plaintiff. The court stated: 
An application of the equitable doctrine of subrogation to 
the transaction gives to [Sutherland] the security he was 
lead to believe he was getting and the same that was held 
by the creditor whose debt he paid, and [George] is left 
with the same security he had before. Sutherland is 
substituted for the investment company as creditor and 
lienholder. No change is made in the rank or relative 
priority of the securities. The transaction consisted of 
mere immaterial changes as to its effect upon plaintiff's 
equities. Equity applies the doctrine of subrogation to a 
great variety of situations and emergencies arising in 
human affairs. Its end is substantial justice, and we 
think it is applicable to facts of this case. 
50 P. at 1034. 
Fullerton v. Bailey, 17 Utah 85, 53 P. 1020 (1898) 
involved a mortgage upon land and owned by the estate of a 
deceased. The land covered by the mortgage, had, previous to 
the settlement of the estate, been conveyed to the appellant by 
the sole legatee under the decedent's will, with the 
representation that there were no estate debts except the 
mortgage in question and that the estate was solvent. After 
the appellant paid the mortgage, a claim was allowed in favor 
of a brother of the deceased which claim absorbed the entire 
estate and left the estate without assets to reimburse the 
appellant the money paid to satisfy the mortgage. The court 
noted: 
Plaintiff was led to believe that no claim such as was 
presented by the brother of the deceased and allowed after 
the time for the presentation of claims had expired, 
existed, or that any claim would consume the entire 
estate. Had plaintiff not paid the [prior] mortgage it 
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would have been foreclosed and the land lost to the 
estate. The payment of the mortgage resulted in a benefit 
to the estate and in injury to no one. If subrogation is 
allowed, no one is injured by it, as the estate and the 
heirs are no worse off. If the appellant is allowed to be 
subrogated to the rights and positions occupied by [the 
prior mortgagee] no one is injured and justice is meted 
out to the parties. The facts to my mind present a clear 
case calling for the application of the doctrine of 
subrogation, which is not alone founded upon contract, 
either express or implied, but upon principles of equity 
and justice intended to offer protection to a meritorious 
creditor, which does not conflict with the legal or 
equitable rights of others.... 
53 P. at 1023. 
In Badger Coal & Lumber Company v. 01sen, 50 Utah 307, 
167 P. 680 (1917) the court addressed the renewal mortgage 
doctrine in a mechanic's lien setting. In that case an owner 
of a parcel of land sold the property to a developer and took 
six promissory notes as payment which were secured by a blanket 
mortgage on 39 lots. The mortgage provided for partial 
releases of the mortgage as to particular lots as payments were 
made. Badger Coal and Lumber supplied materials to a home 
being constructed on Lot 10 and subsequently the blanket 
mortgage was released as to Lot 10. Two mortgages in favor of 
the same mortgagee were recorded subsequently to Badger's 
delivery of materials. With language in which the similarities 
in the rationale and application of the doctrines of equitable 
subrogation and that of renewal mortgage can be seen, the court 
quoted approvingly from 2 Jones on Mortgages, Section 971: 
When a new mortgage is substituted in ignorance of an 
intervening lien, the mortgage, released through mistake, 
may be restored in equity and given its original priority 
as a lien. ... [and] it was considered that although the 
court was not at liberty to infer facts not proved, yet 
that it was at liberty to draw all the inferences which 
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logically and naturally follow from the facts proved; 
[and] that it was not an act of reasonable prudence and 
caution such as men commonly use in the conduct of 
business affairs for one having a first mortgage upon 
property, without consideration or other apparent motive, 
to release it, and take a new mortgage subject to a prior 
lien of a considerable amount; and therefore it may be 
inferred that the mortgagee would not have made the 
release had he known of the intervening mortgage. 
167 P. at 682. 
In holding that the facts of that case did not fall within 
the renewal doctrine, the court noted that the two subsequent 
mortgages were taken for the specific purpose of obtaining 
additional security which was to be derived from the 
improvements constructed and that the notes which the mortgage 
secured were not a renewal of the prior obligation or part 
thereof. Id. at 682. 
B. In Later Opinions This Court Recognized Two 
Classifications Of The Equitable Doctrine Of Subrogation; 
Legal Subrogation And Conventional Or Equitable 
Subrogation. 
The distinction between the two branches of subrogation, 
legal subrogation and equitable or conventional subrogation, 
was first discussed in Bingham v. Walker Brothers Bankers, 75 
Utah 147, 283 P. 1059 (1929). That case involved the competing 
rights of two decedentsf estates in shares of common stock. In 
explaining the doctrine of subrogation, the court stated: 
Subrogation is a remedy highly favored in equity. It 
seems to have first been applied in favor of sureties, but 
has been greatly extended. 
* * * 
Where the person who pays the debt of another stands in 
the situation of a surety or is compelled to pay to 
protect his own right or property, the right of the 
subrogation is a consequence which equity attaches to such 
a condition, and the right of subrogation under such 
circumstances is not the direct result of an agreement. 
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This in the law is termed "legal subrogation." In 
addition to the principle of legal subrogation, there 
exists another principle termed "conventional 
subrogation", which occurs where one who is under no 
obligation to make the payment and who has no right or 
interest to protect pays the debt of another under an 
agreement, express or implied, that he will be subrogated 
to the rights of the original creditor, made with either 
the debtor or the creditor. (Citations omitted.) 
283 P. 1062, 1063. In Bingham v. Walker Brothers Bankers the 
court held that neither legal or conventional subrogation was 
applicable to the facts of the case. Because there was no 
compulsion upon the bank to pay the obligation in order to 
protect its interest, legal subrogation was not applicable. 
Similarly, since the court held the bank to be a volunteer, 
equitable subrogation was not applicable; there being no 
agreement, express or implied, that the bank was to be 
subrogated^ to the rights of the original creditor. 
C. The Modern View Adopted By This Court Applies 
Equitable Subrogation Where There Is An Express Or Implied 
Agreement As A Matter Of Doing Justice Under The 
Circumstances. 
In 1936 this court issued its landmark decision of Martin 
v. Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 150, 59 P.2d 1139, 107 ALR 762 (1936), 
(see Appendix, Exhibit 2). This decision is widely cited upon 
b
 "An agreement that a mortgage shall be kept alive in favor of 
one who advances money to pay it, and that he shall be 
subrogated to its lien, is not necessary to effect such 
subrogation as against the holder of an inferior judgment lien, 
the existence of which he is ignorant, if he makes the advance 
with the understanding that the mortgage shall be satisfied and 
that he shall have a first lien upon the property." Southern 
Cotton Oil Company v. Napoleon Hill Oil Company, 158 S.W. 1082 
(Arkansas 1913). 
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the issue of equitable subrogation.^ in Hickenlooper, the 
court completed an extensive survey of the doctrine, its 
history and development in the United States as well as its 
application. In summarizing its review the court stated: 
From our study we draw the following conclusions: (1) 
That where a lender, in no way related to the property nor 
in any way required to protect an interest, advanced the 
money to pay off a lien, it could not be a case for legal 
subrogation, but must, if anything, come within the 
principles of conventional subrogation. (2) That in 
conventional subrogation there must be an agreement, 
express or implied, that the lender whose money pays off a 
lien will have the same status as the lien his money 
releases to the extent of the debt secured by that lien. 
(3) That equity applies the doctrine of subrogation in 
such cases, not in exacting a performance of the contract, 
but as a matter of doing justice under the circumstances; 
the so called agreement only being of value showing such a 
situation where the doctrine should be applied in order to 
do justice and as evidence that the lender was not a 
volunteer. (4) That the facts or circumstances from 
which the agreement will be implied vary in the different 
courts, some requiring evidence from which an actual 
understanding between the parties may be inferred, while 
others hold that payment under such circumstances as show 
that the lender "supposed" or "intended" to get security 
of the same dignity as that released by his payment is 
sufficient; and some go as far as holding that such 
intention may be inferred from the mere fact that the 
money was advanced for the purpose of paying off another 
lien. (5) That according to the modern view, indiligence 
in searching the record will not prevent equity from 
applying the doctrine unless it is culpable or 
unjustifiable negligence, and that where there is an 
express agreement to subrogate or one from which such 
understanding can plainly be implied, the failure to look 
up the record will not stay the hand of equity for the 
reason that equity will treat the matter as if there was 
an assignment which was in effect what the parties 
intended; that in case of assignment the record would not 
need to be searched. 
59 P.2d 1151,1152. 
y
 e.g. G. Nelson and D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law, 2nd 
Edition, 1985, p. 708, Notes 9,10 and 13; 4 American Law of 
Property, (A.J. Casner ed. 1952), page 344-345, Notes 8, 9, 13, 
15, 18, 19. 
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In Hickenlooper this court upheld the trial court's decree 
of subrogation where a subsequent mortgagee had advanced funds 
for the purpose of paying off a prior loan. The property in 
question was originally owned by Mr. and Mrs. C. H. Stovens and 
on February 1, 1921, the Stovens' executed a mortgage for 
$3,500.00 in favor of the State of Utah. On June 18, 1921, the 
Stovens conveyed the mortgaged property to Clara C. 
Hickenlooper subject to the mortgage. Two days later, on June 
20, 1921, Clara C. and W. A. Hickenlooper, her husband, 
mortgaged the premises to Martin to secure two notes of even 
date in the aggregate amount of $2,500.00. Thereafter, on 
February 24, 1922, Hickenloopers conveyed the property subject 
to the two above specified mortgages to the Fritsch Loan and 
Trust Company. On June 1, 1927, the Fritsch Loan and Trust 
Company delivered to Mrs. Zorn a mortgage to secure its note in 
the amount of $3,500.00. This mortgage did not specify that it 
was subject to any other mortgages. The State's mortgage was 
released on the same day, June 1, 1927, by reason of the money 
advanced by Mrs. Zorn. On the same day, an abstract was 
furnished to Mrs. Zorn certified January 12, 1927, the 
$1,000.00 note payable to Martin had been paid, but the 
$1,500.00 note together with interest thereon remained unpaid. 
Martin brought an action to foreclose, joining Mrs. Zorn 
among others. She cross-complained and answered. As to 
Martin, she claimed a priority on the ground that her money was 
used to pay off the State's note, that it was intended for that 
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purpose, and that the Fritsch Loan and Trust Company, by and 
through its general manager and secretary, agreed that Mrs. 
Zorn's mortgage was to be a first lien and that he made 
representations to Zorn that it was such. Mrs. Zorn had no 
knowledge that Martin had a mortgage on the property until he 
brought suit. She never examined, nor caused to be examined, 
either the abstract or the record. The evidence was that she 
trusted the general manager and that he said she did not need a 
lawyer and that he would have his lawyer look it over. 
In affirming the trial court's decree of subrogation this 
court held: 
Suffice it to say that where there is a promise on the 
part of the mortgagor or his transferee, given to one who 
pays money to pay off a lien, that such lender will be in 
equally as good position as regards security as the 
lienholder whose liens his money was intended to discharge 
and did discharge. [sic] He will be considered in equity 
as an assignee of the lien and especially where assurances 
are given him that his lien will be or is a first lien. 
The evidence in this case, we think, is amply sufficient 
to establish such a promise, if not expressed at least 
implied. 
The court noted that the trial court correctly determined that 
Mrs. Zorn should be paid first from the proceeds of the 
Sheriff's sale. The amount she was entitled to be paid was 
established by the amount of debt Mrs. Zorn discharged, plus 
interest at the rate set forth in that mortgage. As to any 
amount owed Mrs. Zorn in excess of the debt discharged, plus 
interest, Martin had priority. Finally the court reversed a 
personal judgment in favor of Mrs. Zorn as against Stovens, 
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noting that ,f[t]he cases above speak of being subrogated to 
thelien" [of the prior creditor] and not to the debt. 59 P.2d 
at 1152-1153. 
D. Recent Utah Cases Have Applied Principles Of Equitable 
Subrogation To Grant Priority To Later Recorded Mortgages 
Or Trust Deeds Over Intervening Judgment Liens, Equitable 
Liens And Fee title Interests. 
Twenty years passed before the court again directly faced 
a subrogation question.10 In Tracy-Collins Trust Company v. 
Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 301 P.2d 1086 (1956) the defendants 
owned property as joint tenants from the date of acquisition to 
March 31, 1952, when the property was awarded to the wife 
Marion Goeltz in a divorce action. Previously, on October 27, 
1936, the defendants had executed a mortgage covering the real 
property in question in favor of Tracy Loan and Trust Company, 
plaintiff's predecessor-in-interest. The mortgage secured a 
payment of a promissory note in the principal amount of 
$6,000.00. On May 10, 1948, the husband, Francis Boydell 
Goeltz executed a promissory note for $7,100.00. To secure the 
note, a mortgage covering the real property in question was 
executed. The $7,100.00 note and mortgage purported to bear 
the signature of Mrs. Goeltz but the trial court found that 
"the purported signature of appellant was not affixed to said 
1U
 Justice Wolfe however, explained the rationale of Martin v. 
Hickenlooper in Federal Land Bank of Berkley v. Salt Lake 
Valley Sand and Gravel, 96 Utah 359, 85 P.2d 791, 793 (1939). 
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note and mortgage by appellant."11 At the time Mr. Goeltz 
discussed the loan with officers of the plaintiff, he was 
advised that if the loan were made, it would be upon the 
condition that the $6,000.00 mortgage, given October 27, 1936, 
was to be paid off. The papers were prepared and Mr. Goeltz 
signed the papers at the plaintiff's place of business. 
Representing his wife to be ill, Mr. Goeltz requested that he 
be permitted to take the papers to her for her to sign. Mr. 
Goeltz returned the papers with what purported to be her 
signature affixed to the note, the mortgage, and additional 
papers. A check was issued by plaintiff in favor of the 
mortgagee under the 1936 mortgage and the balance of the loan 
was disbursed to Mr. Goeltz. 
Plaintiff commenced foreclosure of the 1948 mortgage and 
the trial court subrogated plaintiff to the position of the 
1936 mortgage. The court ordered that Mr. and Mrs. Goeltz were 
jointly and severally liable for $3,224.41 and Mr. Goeltz was 
liable for and additional $3,576.70. In affirming the trial 
court's decree of subrogation, this court stated: 
In this case [the bank] imposed as a condition to granting 
the new loan that the 1936 mortgage be retired and the 
[bank] have a first mortgage on the premises. It would 
indeed be most inequitable to permit the payment by [the 
bank] of the balance due under the 1936 mortgage under the 
situation here disclosed and permit [Mrs. Goeltz] as well 
1 1
 Reported cases have addressed similar facts, (e.g. Kaminskas 
v. Cepauskis, 218 N.E. 2d 218 (111. App. 1938) which involved 
subrogation of the first lien mortgagee and Daminskas v. 
Cepauski, 12 N.E. 2d 221 (111. App. 1938) which involved 
subrogation of the second lien mortgagee under the same facts. 
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as her former husband to receive a gratuity, unearned and 
not justified, of the $3,224.41 paid to [the prior 
mortgagee]. 
Appellant is in no worse position than had the respondent 
taken assignment of the 1936 mortgage from [the prior 
mortgagee] and a second mortgage for an additional amount 
of approximately $3,900.00. 
301 P.2d 1090. 
In Irving Heights Corporation v. Pace, 29 Utah 2d 80, 
505 P.2d 297 (1973), the plaintiff commenced an action to 
recover damages from the county clerk of Summit County for the 
clerk's failure to properly docket a transcript of judgment in 
which one Reginald Saxton was the judgment debtor. The 
plaintiff had recovered a judgment in the Third Judicial 
District court against Saxton in the amount of $1,030.00 
together with $400.00 attorney's fees and costs. Subsequently 
a transcript of the judgment was forwarded to the defendant 
Pace for entry on the judgment docket in Summit County. The 
judgment was docketed chronologically on June 13, 1968 but was 
not indexed alphabetically until December 1970. At the time 
the transcript of judgment was received by defendant, the 
judgment debtors were mortgagors on a mortgage in favor of 
First National Bank of Coalville. On March 28, 1969, the 
Saxtons executed a second mortgage in a larger amount which was 
thereafter recorded. The evidence showed that the second 
mortgage was a renewal of the first. The Saxtons defaulted on 
the second mortgage and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, which was successor to the First National Bank of 
Coalville, commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage. The 
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plaintiff was made a party defendant in the foreclosure 
proceedings and it was decided that the plaintiff's judgment 
lien was inferior to the second mortgage. 
The plaintiff claimed in Irving Heights, that but for the 
failure of the defendant to properly index the transcript of 
judgment, its judgment lien would have intervened between the 
first mortgage and the renewal mortgage and therefore would 
have had a priority over the mortgage subsequently recorded. 
This court held as follows: 
The second mortgage being a renewal of the first, the 
bank's mortgage lien resulting from the first mortgage 
continued on at least in the amount of the first mortgage 
even though it was subsequently released when the second 
mortgage was recorded. (Citation omitted.) There being no 
interruption in the mortgage lien, we are unable to see 
how the plaintiff was damaged by the failure of the 
defendant to properly index the transcript of judgment. 
505 P.2d at 298. This language resonates the dominate theme 
common to the doctrine of equitable subrogation and that of a 
renewal mortgage. That is, when applicable, the position of 
the intervening lien claimant is not materially changed by the 
application of the doctrines. The only practical difference 
between the two doctrines appears to be with respect to the 
identity of the subsequent mortgagee. If the subsequent 
mortgagee is the same as the original mortgagee, then the 
renewal mortgage doctrine may be applicable. If the subsequent 
mortgagee is a new lender, then equitable subrogation may be 
applicable. 
Finally, and most recently, this court applied subrogation 
principles in Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102 (Utah 1984). The 
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Hortons were divorced in 1977 and as part of the divorce decree 
Mrs. Horton was awarded the parties residence subject to Mr. 
Hortonfs equity interest in the amount of $30,000.00. To 
secure his interest he remained an owner of record title. 
Thereafter Mr. Horton subordinated his equity interest to the 
security interests of two lenders. The first loan was in the 
amount of $35,000.00 from First Security Bank. The second was 
in the amount of $51,000.00 from Murray First Thrift. 
Subsequently Mrs. Horton applied for a third 
"consolidation loan" from Majestic Mortgage in the amount of 
$112,500.00 for the purpose of paying off the first two loans 
and obtaining additional sums for Mrs. Hortonfs investment 
purposes. Apparently, during the processing of this loan and 
execution of the loan documents, a quit claim deed was 
unintentionally executed by Mr. Horton which deed purported to 
convey his interest to Mrs. Horton. Mrs. Horton received the 
loan proceeds in her own name and paid the First Security Bank 
and Murray First Thrift obligations from those proceeds. Later 
she was unable to service Majesticfs mortgage and Majestic 
commenced foreclosure. 
The trial court found the elements of fraud necessary to 
set the quit claim deed aside. In affirming the trial court's 
finding this court stated: 
The purpose of an equity action is to restore the parties 
to the status quo to the extent possible. (Citation 
omitted.) 
It is generally accepted that he who seeks equity must do 
equity. (Citation omitted.) Thus, in order that the 
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fraudulently acquired quit claim deed be set aside and Mr, 
Horton's interest in the subject property be restored to 
him, Mr. Horton must, to the extent possible, return to 
Majestic the benefits received by him that he otherwise 
would not have received. If Majestic had not paid off the 
balances owing on the two loans from First Security and 
Murray First Thrift to which Mr. Horton had voluntarily 
subordinated his $30,000.00 equity interest, Horton's 
interest would still be subordinate to that amount. 
Thus, equity requires that Majestic, having paid 
$86,700.00 to retire the mortgages to First Security and 
Murray First Thrift, should have a priority over Mr. 
Horton to the extent of that amount. 
695 P.2d at 107. Taken as a whole, it would appear that 
Hickenlooper, and the cases before and after, hold with the 
modern view, which regards equitable subrogation as a highly 
favorable doctrine and affords it liberal application; the 
fundamental rationale of the doctrine being, that where 
appropriate, the application of the doctrine does not 
materially change the position of the intervening interest.12 
That position appears to be well supported by the decisions 
from other forums which evidence the continuing viability of 
the doctrine.13 
1Z
 "... to substitute one creditor for another would apparently 
place the junior lienor in no worse position than he was." 
Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d at 1151, citing Jackson Trust 
Company v. Gilkinson, 105 N.J.Eq. 116, 147 A. 113 (1929). 
1 3
 e.g.; Klotz v. Klotz, 440 N.W. 2d 406 (Iowa 1989); Smith v. 
State Savings and Loan Association, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1092, 223 
Cal. Rptr. 298 (1986); Caito v. United California Bank, 576 
P.2d 466 (Cal. 1978); Turney v. Roberts, 501 S.W. 2d 601 (Ark. 
1973); and Capabianco v. Bork, 256 A. 2d 76 (N.J. 1969). 
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POINT II 
NEITHER THE CASES WHICH HAVE ADDRESSED EQUITABLE 
SUBROGATION, NOR THE UTAH MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE 
AFFORD ANY BASIS FOR DIFFERENTIATING THE APPLICATION 
OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION VIS-A-VIS AN INTERVENING 
MECHANIC'S LIEN FROM ANY OTHER INTERVENING 
REAL PROPERTY INTEREST 
The above cases discussed have considered equitable 
subrogation and the related doctrine of renewal mortgage in 
various factual settings including intervening judgment liens, 
intervening mortgages, claims upon decedent's estates, 
equitable liens and fee title interests. No Utah case has yet 
addressed equitable subrogation as it affects the priority of 
an intervening mechanic's lien. 
A. Cases Which Have Denied The Doctrine Of Equitable 
Subrogation Vis-a-Vis An Intervening Mechanic's Lien Have 
Done So Because The Facts Of Those Cases Did Not Justify 
Application Of The Doctrine. 
There is however, no reason or rationale for denying the 
application of the doctrine simply by virtue of the fact that 
the form of the intervening interest is a mechanic's lien as 
opposed to that of some other interest. In Houston Investment 
Banking v. First City Bank of Highland Village, 640 S.W. 2d 660 
(Tex. App. 1982) the court subrogated a lender to the lien 
rights of a prior vendor, affording it a priority over an 
intervening judgment lien. In relying upon Diversified 
Mortgage Investors v. Blaylock General Contractors, Inc., 576 
S.W. 2d 794 (Tex. 1978) the Texas Court of Appeals stated: 
Although it involves a mechanic's lien instead of a 
judgment lien, the fact pattern in regard to the Irving 
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project in Diversified Mortgage Investors parallels the 
facts of this case . . . . In both Diversified Mortgage 
Investors and the present case the intervening lien (ie. 
the mechanic's lien and the judgment lien, respectively) 
had its inception prior to the date of recording the deed 
of trust lien held by appellant• 
660 S.W. 2d at 662-663. 
Similarly, the various facts to which this court has 
applied the equitable subrogation and renewal mortgage 
doctrines, and the discussions in those cases, indicate no 
basis for denying the application of equitable subrogation 
solely by virtue of the fact that the intervening interest 
takes the form of a mechanic's lien, assuming all other 
criteria are satisfied. Indeed, appellant's research upon this 
issue has revealed no case in which equitable subrogation has 
been denied over an intervening mechanic's lien on that basis 
alone. 
Appellant's research has however, revealed cases involving 
intervening mechanics liens in which subrogation has been 
denied due to the failure to satisfy the doctrine's 
requirements: Collateral Investment Company v. Pilgrim, 421 
S.2d 1274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982), (funds not advanced at 
instance of debtor to satisfy prior encumbrance); Southwest 
Title and Trust Co., Inc. v. Norman Lumber Company, 441 P.2d 
430 (Okl. 1968), (no clear implication that subsequent 
mortgagee was to have mortgage of equal dignity of that 
discharged); Canton Morris Plan Bank v. Most, 184 N.E. 765 
(Ohio 1932), (subrogation denied because mechanic's lien 
claimants would be prejudiced by subrogation since bank was not 
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ignorant of work done and materials supplied and knowingly 
allowed artisans to enhance value of premises); Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company v. First Security Bank of Idaho, 491 
P.2d 1261 (Idaho 1971), (subrogation denied because no evidence 
of an express or implied agreement of subrogation); Fleetwood 
v. Med Center Bank, 786 S.W. 2d 550 (Tex. App. 1990), 
(subrogation denied because its application would result in 
cognizable prejudice to junior lienholder); Peterson v. Zero 
Estates, 261 N.E. 2d 346 (Minn. 1977), (subrogation denied 
since subsequent loan was to finance continued construction and 
bank had knowledge of construction). 
B. The Purposes Of The Utah Mechanic's Lien Statute Are 
Not Compromised By Application Of The Doctrine Of 
Equitable Subrogation. 
Further, an examination of the Utah mechanic's lien 
statutes and the cases interpreting them afford no basis for 
denying subrogation solely upon the fact that the intervening 
lien is a mechanic's lien. This conclusion is true even though 
upon first blush, application of the doctrine of equitable 
subrogation would appear to be in conflict with the priority 
afforded a mechanic's lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 38-1-5 as fully set forth at pages 1-2 herein. 
It is well established that the purpose of the mechanic's 
lien statutes is to protect those who have added directly to 
the value of property by performing labor or furnishing 
materials. AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development & Energy 
Co., 714 P.2d 289 (1986); Stanton Transportation Company v. 
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Davis, 9 Utah 2d 184, 341 P. 2d 207 (1959). The statute is 
designed to prevent a landowner from taking the benefit of 
improvements to the property without paying for the labor and 
materials incorporated into the improvements. Frehner v. 
Morton, 18 Utah 2d 422, 424 P.2d 446, 447 (1967), King Brothers 
v. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 Utah 2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 (1962). 
The statute is remedial in nature and intended to give the lien 
claimant the benefit of his bargain and will be broadly 
construed to effect that purpose. Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138 
(Utah App. 1989) citing Interiors Contracting v. Navalco, 648 
P.2d 1382, 1386 (Utah 1982). There is no evidence however, in 
the statutes or in the cases interpreting the statutes that 
they are intended to grant a windfall to the lien claimants, 
which in the absence of equitable subrogation, would occur in 
this case. Indeed, those jurisdictions in which the issue has 
been presented have uniformly applied equitable subrogation 
without distinction or regard to the fact that the intervening 
interest is a mechanic's lien, when all other criteria were 
satisfied. 
C. Cases Which Have Applied Equitable Subrogation 
Vis-a-Vis An Intervening Mechanic's Lien Have Accomplished 
Substantial Justice Without Prejudicing The Rights Of The 
Mechanic's Lien Claimants. 
This court has previously given a strong indication that 
is supports the view discussed in the preceeding subsection. 
In both Martin v. Hickenlooper and Tracy-Collins Trust Company 
v. Goeltz, the court quoted with approval from Jackson v. 
Gilkinson, 105 N.J.Eq. 116,, 147 A. 113 (1929), (See Appendix, 
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Exhibit 3), a case which addressed the subrogation of a 
subsequently recorded mortgage over an intervening mechanicf s 
lien. That case is of particular significance both because it 
has been approved by this court and because its facts are so 
closely analogous to those of the instant case. 
In Jackson Trust Company v. Gilkinson, defendant's 
borrowed $8,500.00 from the plaintiff to pay off a first 
mortgage which was in default and about to be foreclosed. Of 
that amount, $7,977.04 was paid to a first mortgagee and the 
balance was applied to taxes. Approximately six weeks prior to 
the execution and recordation of plaintiff's mortgage, 
defendant had contracted with a mechanic's lien claimant for 
the construction of a garage on the rear of the mortgaged 
premises. In noting that the defendants had delivered their 
affidavit to plaintiffs to the effect there were no liens or 
encumbrances against the property, the court stated: 
The complainant, in my judgment, is entitled to be 
subrogated to the amount paid by it in satisfaction of the 
first mortgage ... 
* * * 
[W]here, as in the case sub judice, no one is injured by 
the mistake, and no one has changed his position by reason 
of the ... mistake, there is no good reason why the 
mistake should not be corrected although the highest 
degree of vigilance has not been exercised. 
147 A. 114, 115. 
In Peterman-Donnelly Engineers and Contractors v. First 
National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix, 2 Ariz. App. 321, 408 P.2d 
841 (1965), a case similar to the present action, the court 
applied the doctrine of equitable subrogation in a case 
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involving an intervening mechanic's lien. In that case the 
subject property was encumbered by a first mortgage in favor of 
Eyre which was later paid from a larger construction loan made 
by First National Bank. Prior to the construction loan being 
recorded, work had begun on the project and a mechanic's lien 
had been filed by the plaintiff. The court held equitable 
subrogation to be applicable as follows: 
The evidence supporting the [motion for summary judgment] 
revealed that at the time the property in question was 
conveyed to the Association from the Chamber [of 
Commerce], it was understood that a part of the loan 
forwarded by the appellee to the Association was to be 
used to satisfy the debt to Eyre. It is likewise evident 
from the depositions that appellee-bank regarded itself as 
stepping into the shoes of Eyre. However no formal 
assignment of the prior mortgage to appellee was executed, 
but it is implicit that the parties intended the appellee 
to have the security attached to the prior mortgage. 
Where such an understanding, express or implied, exists, 
the law generally allows a subsequent mortgagee to be 
subrogated to the rights of a prior mortgage where the 
subsequent mortgagee has advanced money to the debtor to 
satisfy the prior mortgage, and where the subsequent 
mortgagee is not a mere volunteer. 
408 P.2d at 846. The Arizona court cited Martin v. 
Hickenlooper, supra, as the leading case on the issue of 
equitable subrogation and quoted the following language from 
Emmert v. Thompson, 49 Minn. 386, 52 N.W. 31 (1892), which was 
also quoted in Martin v. Hickenlooper: 
The better opinion now is that one who loans his money 
upon real estate security for the express purpose of 
taking up or discharging liens and encumbrances on the 
same property has thus paid the debt at the instance, 
request and solicitation of the debtor, expecting and 
believing, in good faith, that his security will, of 
record, be substituted, in fact, in place of that which he 
discharges, is neither a volunteer, stranger, nor 
intermeddler... . 
402 2d at 846. The Arizona court also followed Tracy-Collins 
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Trust Company v. Goeltz, supra in establishing the priority of 
the bank's security interest vis-a-vis the mechanic's lien. 
Southern Colonial Mortgage Company Inc. v. Medeiros, 347 
S. 2d 736 (Florida App. 1977) involved a contest as to the 
priorities between mortgages and mechanic's liens on a 
condominium development. In March and April of 1974 the 
mortgagees had extended two loans to two purchasers of 
condominium apartments. Portions of the loans were paid 
directly to the construction lender-mortgagee to secure a 
release of the construction mortgage which had been recorded 
approximately 18 months earlier on September 13, 1972. A 
notice of commencement of work was recorded on May 15, 1973 and 
the lienholders recorded their liens in August and November of 
1974 and January of 1975. The purchasers of the condominium 
apartments defaulted and the mortgagee commenced foreclosure 
joining the lien claimants as defendants. The trial court held 
the lienholders' claims were superior to the mortgages on the 
basis that the mechanic's liens related back to and attached as 
of the date of the recording of the notice of commencement. In 
reversing, the court of appeals stated: 
The mortgagees/appellants next claim they were entitled to 
priority by reason of being subrogated to the rights of 
the construction mortgage to the extent that the mortgage 
was paid by them. The construction mortgage predated the 
mechanic's liens and the payments by the appellant-
mortgagees did pay off in full the construction mortgage 
insofar as it encumbered each condominium unit involved. 
Continuing, the appeals court said: 
This right of subrogation has been recognized in Florida: 
"The rule is academic that one who makes a loan to 
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discharge a first mortgage, pursuant to an agreement with 
the mortgagor that he shall have a first mortgage on the 
same lands to secure it, the lendor will be subrogated to 
the rights of the first mortgagee, notwithstanding there 
is at the same time a second outstanding mortgage of which 
he (the lendor) is ignorant." (Citations omitted.) 
The equitable result of such rule was further stated by 
the Supreme Court: 
"The application of this rule works common justice to all; 
it prevents injury to the appellant, who furnished the 
money to pay off the first mortgage in ignorance of the 
second; it gives appellant the benefit of its payment; it 
carries out the intention of the parties and leaves ... 
the holder of the junior mortgage in his original 
position. One of the first tests determining the 
application of this rule is whether or not subrogation to 
the place of the prior or retired lien puts the holder of 
the second lien in any worse position than if the prior 
lien had not been discharged." (Citations omitted.) 
* * * 
We agree that an assignment would be the better practice 
to insure the successor mortgagee's subrogation rights. 
However, under the circumstances of this case and the 
equitable principles set out above we do not feel the 
failure to secure an assignment prevents subrogation. And 
by recognizing the mortgagee's subrogation rights, the 
lienholders are not placed in any worse position than if 
the construction mortgage had not been released. 
347 So.2d at 738-739. 
One of the most recent and perhaps most illuminating 
decisions addressing equitable subrogation and an intervening 
mechanic's lien is Diversified Mortgage Investors v. Lloyd D. 
Blaylock General Contractors, Inc., 576 S.W. 2d 794 (Texas 
1978) (See Appendix, Exhibit 4). That case discussed the 
relative priority of a mechanic's lien, a vendor's lien, a 
construction loan and a loan for the permanent financing 
(sometimes referred to as a "take-out loan"). The case 
addressed facts in which two motels were constructed on 
properties, one each in Fort Worth and Irving, Texas. The 
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doctrine of equitable subrogation was applicable only as to the 
Irving, Texas development. 
The Irving property was purchased by Dollar Inns of 
America (Dollar Inns) for $309,900.00 with funds borrowed from 
Palomar Mortgage Investors (Palomar) on April 5, 1973. This 
purchase was pursuant to a Tri-Party Agreement among Dollar 
Inns, Palomar and Diversified Mortgage Investors (DMI) which 
provided that Palomar would lend funds to Dollar Inns for the 
purchase of the property and construction of the motel. DMI 
would pay off Palomar with proceeds from the permanent 
financing. On April 5, 1973, the day Dollar Inns purchased the 
property, construction had already begun pursuant to a 
construction contract which the general contractor (Blaylock) 
had previously entered into with Dollar Inns. Also on April 5, 
1973, the property was subject to a preexisting vendor's lien 
held by First Bank and Trust of Richardson. As part of the 
April 5th closing, $109,900.00 of the $309,900.00 borrowed from 
Palomar was used to pay off First Bank and Trust of Richardson 
and the bank released its vendor's lien one week later on April 
12, 1973. Upon completion of construction Palomar assigned its 
interest in the deed of trust to DMI. Dollar Inns subsequently 
defaulted in payments on the note secured by the deed of trust 
and DMI conducted a foreclosure sale under its trust deed on 
December 3, 1974. In the meantime, Blaylock commenced an 
action in district court to foreclose its mechanic's lien 
naming DMI as a defendant. In determining the priorities of 
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the parties' liens, the Texas Supreme Court stated: 
The date of inception of the mechanic's lien preceded both 
the execution and recordation of DMI' s deed of trust lien 
on the Irving Property; therefore, if there was no other 
factor involved, such mechanic's lien would be senior and 
superior. 
There is an additional factor, however, and that is the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation. 
576 S.W. 2d 806-807. The court continued by stating: 
We recognize the importance of this doctrine to lenders in 
this state. It serves to protect a lienholder from 
intervening liens, at least to the amount of the initial 
lien, when the lienholder has discharged a prior superior 
lien. 
576 S.W. 2d 807. In explaining its ruling the court stated: 
To put the matter more clearly, let us suppose that at the 
time of closing on the Irving property Dollar Inns had not 
purchased and Richardson bank had not sold and released 
its vendor's lien. This would result in the Richardson 
Bank holding a vendor's lien, Blaylock having a mechanic's 
and materialman's lien, and DMI having a deed of trust 
lien. Under those circumstances, it could not be doubted 
but that the Richardson Bank would hold the senior lien, 
superior to both Blaylock's and DMI's liens. That being 
the case, it also cannot be [disputed] that DMI stepped 
into the shoes of the Richardson Bank, at least to the 
extent of the Richardson Bank's lien, by virtue of the 
doctrine of equitable subrogation. By foreclosing its 
deed of trust lien, DMI foreclosed the preexisting 
vendor's lien secured thereby and it may now assert the 
priority of the bank's lien. 
The result of this holding is that the liens stand in the 
following order of priority: (1) the Richardson bank's 
vendor's lien in the amount of $109,900.00 to which DMI 
was subrogated; (2) Blaylock's mechanic's lien in the 
amount of $136,767.00; and (3) the balance due on the 
note secured by the deed of trust held by DMI. The 
fundamental essence of this holding is that all proceeds 
received at the foreclosure sale of December 3, 1974 in 
excess of $109,900.00 (the extent of DMI's subrogation) 
were excess proceeds. (Emphasis in original.) 
576 S.W. 2d at 807. 
Subsequent to establishing the priority of the lien, the 
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court addressed the further question of the appropriate remedy 
in view of the fact that the trust deed had been non-judicially 
foreclosed prior to the trial court's decree of foreclosure of 
Blaylock's mechanic's lien. The court elaborated: 
Under these circumstances we are squarely faced with the 
precise question which this court reserved for judgment in 
Irving Lumber Company,, supra: Whether Blaylock may pursue 
the excess proceeds of the foreclosure sale. We agree 
with the court of civil appeals holding that Blaylock may 
pursue the excess proceeds. (Citations omitted). This is 
the logical result inasmuch as DMI's right of subrogation 
extends only to the amount of the preexisting vendor's 
lien. 
576 S.W. 2d at 808. 
POINT III 
THE EQUITIES OF THIS CASE FAVOR APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE 
SUBROGATION TO DEFENDANT SECURITY PACIFIC, GRANTING 
PRIORITY TO ITS TRUST DEED OVER THE MECHANIC'S LIEN 
OF PLAINTIFF 
A. Subrogation Effectuates The Expectations Of The 
Parties Hereto Without Prejudicing Or Granting A Windfall 
To Either Party And Without Affecting The Purpose Of The 
Mechanic's Lien Statues. 
The instant case presents a very compelling factual 
setting for the application of the doctrine of equitable 
subrogation. The loan was requested by defendant Youngman for 
the purpose of paying off existing encumbrances against her 
property and she expressly agreed that Ameristar would have a 
first lien to secure the loan to her. (Record at 100, 151, 
213, 214, 215). There was a further representation under oath 
by defendant Youngman that she had not caused or created any 
other encumbrances against the property. (Record at 100, 151, 
214, 215). Ameristar clearly bargained for a first position 
lien against the property and paid $303,545.95 to satisfy the 
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prior encumbrances. Defendant Security Pacific succeeded to 
the interest of Ameristar by assignment dated October 15, 
1988. (Record at 102). Diversified Mortgage Investors v. 
Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractors, Inc., supra, at 806-807. 
On the other hand, there is no evidence that plaintiff 
bargained for any security for the payment of labor and 
materials supplied by him other than that provided by law. His 
interest was clearly junior to the encumbrances which were 
against the property at the time he commenced supplying 
painting labor and materials thereto. He is charged with 
knowledge of those encumbrances. Utah Code Annotated Section 
57-3-2; Capital Lumbering Co. v. Ryan, 34 Or. 73, 54 P. 1094, 
(1894). Plaintiff did not change his position in reliance on 
those liens being satisfied. (Record at 250). By subrogating 
defendant Security Pacific to the lien priority of the 
encumbrances paid from the loan proceeds, to the extent of 
those payments of $303,545.95, plaintiff is in no worse 
position than had defendant Youngman not refinanced those 
existing obligations. 
The facts of this case fall squarely within the holding of 
Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra. There was a clear, express 
agreement on the part of defendant Youngman that Ameristar 
would have security equal to that of the liens which were 
satisfied by its loan proceeds. Martin v. Hickenlooper held as 
follows: 
Suffice it to say that where there is a promise on the 
part of the mortgagor or his transferee, given to one who 
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pays money to pay off a lien, that such lender will be in 
equally as good position as regards security as the lien 
holder whose lien his money was intended to discharge and 
did discharge. [sic] He will be considered in equity as 
an assignee of the lien and especially where assurances 
are given him that his lien will be or is a first lien. 
59 P.2d at 1152. 
Equity should apply subrogation in this case, not in 
derogation of the mechanic's lien statutes, but in light of 
them. Those who supply labor and materials to improve real 
property are granted by statute a lien against the property so 
improved to the extent they are not paid for their labor and 
materials. Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-1 et seq. The 
unique feature of the mechanic's lien statutes is that the lien 
attaches as of the commencement of the improvement to the 
property and not when a notice of lien is recorded in the 
county recorder's office. Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-5. 
Consequently, those who perform the finishing touches to the 
project are given the same priority as those who begin a 
project by excavation or otherwise. Utah Code Annotated 
38-1-10. However, once the priority date is established, a 
mechanic's lien claimant is not accorded a favored status over 
any other type of lien claimant. He has no greater equity than 
a judgment lienholder, a mortgagee, a trust deed beneficiary or 
a vendor. 
In this case, it is undisputed that plaintiff's mechanic's 
lien attached subsequent to the recordation of the existing 
obligations against defendant Youngman's property, and prior to 
the recordation of the trust deed in favor of Ameristar. 
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However, because equity, under Martin v. Hickenlooper, treats 
the payment by Ameristar of the existing obligations as an 
assignment of the liens so paid, the trust deed of Ameristar 
(which was later assigned to defendant Security Pacific) is 
deemed to have attached not at the time it was recorded, but as 
of the recording date of the liens it paid. Consequently, the 
provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 38-1-5 are not 
defeated by the application of equitable subrogation. 
B. The Undisputed Facts Herein Show A Clear Express 
Agreement Calling For Subrogation Coupled With An Absence 
Of Culpable Negligence On The Part Of Defendant Security 
Pacific And Its Predecessor-In-Interest 
There is no evidence in this case which would suggest that 
equity should stay its hand in subrogating defendant Security 
Pacific to the prior encumbrances. There is no hint of fraud 
or wrongdoing on the part of Ameristar or defendant Security 
Pacific and neither Ameristar nor defendant Security Pacific is 
guilty of culpable negligence. Plaintiff's mechanic's lien was 
not recorded until November 16, 1988, after both the 
recordation of the Ameristar trust deed on July 7, 1988 and its 
assignment to defendant Security Pacific on October 15, 1988. 
Furthermore, one of the conclusions drawn by the court in 
Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra, is that the clearer the 
agreement of subrogation or the assurances of a first lien, the 
less important the lender's negligence, if any, becomes. In 
American Law of Property, Section 16.151, page 353, the authors 
make the following observation: 
In passing it may be worth remark that if the basis for 
subrogation really is contractual it would be puzzling to 
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understand why carelessness or notice should be thought to 
have any part whatsoever. "If subrogation depends upon an 
implied or express agreement to subrogate, what boots it 
whether or no [sic] the lender had notice of subsequent 
liens?" (Quoting Martin v. Hickenlooper, supra, at 1143). 
In Capital Lumbering Co. v. Ryan, supra, the court 
observed that if a lender is ignorant of a recorded intervening 
lien, and yet is entitled to equitable relief, the right to 
such relief is even more meritorious if the intervening lien is 
a mechanic's lien which was unrecorded at the time the loan was 
given. In that regard the court stated: 
...the [mechanic's] lien of plaintiff had not been filed, 
nor had Ryan [the owner] made default in his payments; 
and, this being so, it would be carrying the doctrine 
further than any adjudged case of which we have knowledge 
to \. Id that the defendant Noble [lender] is not entitled 
to i.ave his lien restored to the position of the original 
mortgage as against the plaintiff's lien, simply because 
he knew the building was then in process of construction 
and uncompleted, and especially so when such restoration 
does not interfere with any superior equity. 
45 P. at 1095. 
In this case, there is no evidence of notice to Ameristar 
of the painting labor performed by plaintiff. There is no 
evidence in the record to the effect that a person inspecting 
the property at the time Ameristar?s trust deed went of record 
would have been on notice that an improvement to the property 
was underway. But even if such would have been the case, that 
fact would not bar the application of equitable subrogation. 
As noted by the court in Jackson Trust Company v. 
Gilkinson, supra, the fact that the lender could have inspected 
the property and ascertained that a garage was in the course of 
construction (possibly giving rise to a mechanic's lien claim), 
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but failed to do so, such failure did not constitute 
inexcusable or culpable negligence such as to bar the 
application of equitable subrogation. The court held as 
follows in that case: 
If the complainant had caused an inspection to be made of 
the mortgaged premises, it would readily have ascertained 
that the aforesaid garage was in course of erection, and 
thus be put upon notice of inquiry respecting such right 
as the building contractor may have claimed by way of 
mechanic's lien, but complainant's neglect in the this 
respect cannot operate as a bar to the equitable relief 
sought herein, particularly for the reason that Bahr, the 
mechanic's lien claimant, is not in anywise injured 
thereby. 
147 A. at 115. 
The concurring opinion of Justice Wolfe in Federal Land 
Bank of Berkeley v. Salt Lake Valley Sand & Gravel Company, 96 
Utah 359, 85 P.2d 791, 793 (1939), is instructive on the degree 
of negligence necessary to stay equitable relief: 
In Martin v. Hlckenlooper, 90 Utah 150, 50 P.2d 1139, we 
considered the authorities which more and more show a 
development toward not permitting a windfall to one person 
because of the mere negligence of another where he has not 
been injured by the negligence. It requires gross 
negligence before another may fortuitously and vicariously 
benefit by that negligence. 
The evidence in this case clearly shows that neither 
Ameristar nor Security Pacific was guilty of negligence or 
other conduct which would preclude the application of equitable 
subrogation. 
POINT IV 
SUBROGATION ACCOMPLISHES SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN THIS CASE 
BY ACCORDING PRIORITY TO THE DEED OF TRUST OF DEFENDANT 
SECURITY PACIFIC ONLY TO THE EXTENT OF THE FUNDS 
ADVANCED TO PAY EXISTING OBLIGATIONS. 
The subrogation of defendant Security Pacific to the 
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position of the encumbrances paid by the loan proceeds from 
Ameristar gives defendant Security Pacific a first position 
lien against the subject property to the extent of $303,545.95, 
plaintiff's mechanic's lien a second position and Security 
Pacific a third position in the amount of $16,454.05 
($320,000.00 - $303,545.95). As noted in Tracy-Collins Trust 
Company v. Goeltz, supra, where the amount subrogated is less 
than the total funds advanced by the person paying off the 
earlier lien, the lender is subrogated to the amount of the 
prior encumbrances paid with the intervening lien claimant 
taking a second position to that amount. In that case, the 
funds advanced totaled $7,100.00, but the first mortgage 
extinguished by those funds was $3,224.41. The court stated 
the rationale for this result as follows: 
Appellant is in no worse position than had respondent 
taken an assignment of the 1936 mortgage from Pacific 
Mutual Life Insurance Company and a second mortgage for 
the additional amount of approximately $3,900.00. 
Consequently, the court held that the lender had a first 
position lien to the extent of $3,224.41 and subjected the fee 
title of Mrs. Goeltz to that amount. Only the interest of Mr. 
Goeltz was subject to the balance of the loan proceeds of 
$7,100.00. 
In Peterman-Donnelly Engineers and Contractors Corp. v. 
First National Bank of Arizona, Phoenix, supra, the court 
followed Tracy-Collins Trust Company v. Goeltz in holding that 
the lender was in a first position to the extent of the first 
mortgage paid of $11,600.00, the mechanic's lien claimant then 
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held a second position and the balance of the $35,000.00 loan 
($35,000 - $11,600) was relegated to a third position behind 
the mechanic's lien claimant. 
An additional factor in the present case is that the 
subject property was sold at a trustee's sale in July 1990 
pursuant to the terms of the trust deed given to Ameristar. A 
similar fact situation was presented in Diversified Mortgage 
Investors v. Lloyd D. Blaylock General Contractor, Inc., supra, 
except that in that case the successful credit bid of the trust 
deed beneficiary at the sale was greater than the amount to 
which the lender was subrogated. The court allocated the 
proceeds of the trustee's sale as follows: 
In summary, ... DMI's deed of trust lien is senior and 
superior to Blaylock's mechanic's lien only to the extent 
of the Richardson bank's preexisting vendor's lien in the 
sum of $109,900.00. Beyond that amount, Blaylock has a 
valid and subsisting lien in the amount of $136,767; 
however, the sale by the trustee under the deed of trust 
transferred the land itself free of all liens; therefore, 
Blaylock's security interest is transferred to the excess 
proceeds from the sale, which stand in the place of the 
property and may be reached by Blaylock. Whatever remains 
thereafter goes to DMI on the balance due on the note. 
Since DMI bid in the land at its own foreclosure sale, no 
cash actually changed hands. Instead, DMI took title to 
the land in cancellation of part of the loan. 
Consequently, we are of the opinion that the court of 
civil appeals correctly determined that Blaylock's proper 
remedy was in the form of a money judgment against DMI for 
the unpaid amount of its lien on the Irving property. 
576 S.W. 2d at 808. 
In the present case, the amount bid at the trustee's sale 
was less than the amount to which defendant Security Pacific 
was subrogated. (Record at 248). Accordingly, there are no 
excess proceeds from the trustee's sale to which the mechanic's 
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lien of plaintiff may attach. The trustee's sale extinguished 
the lien of plaintiff and an unencumbered fee title became 
vested in Security Pacific after the trustee's sale. 
The summary judgment entered by the trial court should be 
reversed, the trust deed of defendant Security Pacific should 
be subrogated in the amount of $303,545.95 to the position of 
the prior encumbrances, the mechanic's lien of plaintiff should 
be held junior to that amount, and the balance of the loan 
proceeds from Ameristar should be held to be in a third 
position. As a result of the trustee's sale, defendant 
Security Pacific became the fee title holder of the subject 
property and the mechanic's lien of plaintiff was 
extinguished. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant Security Pacific 
respectfully requests that the court reverse the summary 
judgment entered by the trial court, that judgment be entered 
in favor of defendant Security Pacific subrogating its trust 
deed to the amount of the prior liens paid from its loan 
proceeds, totaling $303,545.95, that the mechanic's lien of 
plaintiff be held junior to that amount, and that the 
mechanic's lien of plaintiff be held extinguished as a result 
of the trustee's sale in July 1990. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT SECURITY PACIFIC BANK to the 
following on March £—, 1992, postage prepaid, addressed as 
follows: 
Ralph R. Tate 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, #202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
youngman/c/1-5 0 
SHERMAN C. YOUNG 
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APPENDIX 
Exhibit 1 
J . Lamar Richards v . S e c u r i t y P a c i f i c Na t iona l Bank 
Supreme Court No. 910547 
Dates Chain of T i t l e Encumbrances, 
Executed and S e c u r i t y 
(Recorded) Conveyances I n t e r e s t s , e t c . 
JENTZCH BUNCE JENSEN 
B e n e f i c i a r y 
or 
Vendor 
Q . C . D . W . D . W . D . 
# 4 0 7 8 4 0 1 # 4 0 7 8 4 0 2 # 4 0 7 8 4 0 3 
3 / 2 0 / 8 5 4 / 1 8 / 8 5 4 / 2 2 / 8 5 
( 4 / 2 5 / 8 5 ) 
3 / 0 1 / 8 5 
( 4 / 2 5 / 8 5 ) 
4 / 2 2 / 8 5 
( 4 / 2 5 / 8 5 ) 
4 / 2 2 / 8 5 
( 4 / 2 5 / 8 5 ) 
4 / 2 2 / 8 5 
( 4 / 2 5 / 8 5 ) 
4 / 1 5 / 8 5 
( 4 / 2 5 / 8 5 ) 
4 / 1 5 / 8 5 
->ZSCHEILE< 
T r u s t D e e d 
- # 4 0 7 8 4 0 4 
-> BUNCE 
Trust Deed 
-#4078405 > TAL 
Trust Deed 
-#4078406 > JENSEN 
ZSCHEILE 
W.D. 
#4078407 
I 
LAFAYETTE 
PROPERTIES 
INC, 
LAFAYETTE 
PROPERTIES 
INC. 
Vendee's Int. 
in U.R.E.C. 
<-
$86,414.00 
$1,615.95 
$10,000.00 
Trust Deed $151,970.00 
-#4078408 > ZSCHEILE < 
Vendors Sec. 
Int. in LAFAYETTE $53,54 6.00 
-U.R.E.C. > PROPERTIES < 
INC. 
6/28/88 
(6/29/88) 
7/01/88 
(7/07/88) 
YOUNC 
YOUN( 
3MAN 
^ 
< 
3MAN 
(7/22/88) 
Work Commences 
U.R.E. Contract Recorded 
Trust Deed 
#4647262 > AMERISTAR 
$320,000.00 
$303,545.95 
Reconveyance of Bunce, Tal, 
Jensen and Zscheile Trust Deeds 
Exhibit 2 
Martin v. Hickenlooper 
90 U t a h 1 5 0 , 59 P . 2 d 1139 ( 1 9 3 6 ) 
Chain of T i t l e Encumbrances, 
and Secu r i ty 
Dates Conveyances I n t e r e s t s , e t c . Mortgagee 
Mortgage 
2/01/21 Stovens > State of Utah < 
I $3,500.00 
6/18/21 Deed 
I Mortgage 
6/20/21 Hickenlooper > Martin 
I $2,500.00 
2/24/22 Deed 
Mortgage 
6/01/27 Fritsch Loan > Zorn $ 
$3,500.00 
Exhibit 3 
Jackson Trust Company v. Gilkinson 
147 A. 113 (N.J. Eq. 1929) 
Dates 
Chain of T i t l e Encumbrances, 
and Secu r i ty 
Conveyances I n t e r e s t s , e t c . 
Mortgagee 
or 
Lien Claimant 
Mortgage 
Gi lk inson > G r e e n v i l l e Heights B.& L.A. <-
3/34/27 
Contract entered 
< John Bahr 
Work Commenced 
Mortgage 
5/05/27 Gilkinson > Jackson Trust Company $7,977.04 
$8,500.00 
Exhibit 4 
D i v e r s i f i e d Mortcracre I n v e s t o r s v , Lloyd P. 
Blaylock General Contractors Inc. 
576 S.W.2d 794 (Texas 1978) 
Dates 
Chain of T i t l e 
and 
Conveyances 
Encumbrances, 
Secur i ty 
I n t e r e s t s , e t c . 
Benef i c i a ry , 
Lien Claimant, 
Vendor 
4 / 0 5 / 7 3 
4 / 0 5 / 7 3 
4/05/73 
(4/13/73) 
2 / 0 5 / 7 4 
Unnamed 
Vendee 
V e n d o r s Lien 
Unnamed 
Vendee 
Deed 
I 
Dollar 
Inns 
Work Commences 
Trust Deed 
-> Richardson Bank 
Blaylock Contractors 
-> Palomar $109,000.00 
Assignment 
of 
Trust Deed 
Diversified Mortgage 
Investors 
Exhibit 5 
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Third Judicial District 
SHERMAN C. YOUNG (3891) 
JERRY L. REYNOLDS (2728) 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendant, Security 
Pacific National Bank 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: (801) 375-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. LAMAR RICHARDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBRA L.YOUNGMAN & et a L , 
Defendant. 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and for good 
cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed as against defendant 
Deborah Diamanti, without prejuedice, each party to bear their 
- J =£*_ 
Approved as to Form t 
Ralph R. Tate Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Lamar Richards 
DEC 0 2 1991 
Deputy CM* 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
AS AGAINST DEFENDANT 
DIAMANTI 
Civil No 890904949CN 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
youngman.ord.1 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Order of Dismissal As Against Defendant Diamanti 
to the following on November 3^> 1991, postage prepaid, 
addressed as follows: 
Ralph R. Tate 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, #202 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
Larry G. Reed 
Attorney at Law 
455 South 300 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Deborah Diamanti 
225 N. Main, #101 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
youngman/1 
SHERMAN 
-
A
-oJLi 
• ' v. l . 
Th. iO ' «i 
AUG 2 0 1931 
RALPH R. TATE, JR. (#3192) VJ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 278-4747 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. LAMAR RICHARDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBRA L. YOUNGMAN, et al., 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
AMENDMENT TO JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE OF FORE-
CLOSURE DATED 5-8-90 
Civil No. 890904949CN 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
This matter came before the court on motions for summary 
judgment filed by plaintiff and defendant Security Pacific National 
Bank, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
The issue presented for decision was the relative priority of 
plaintiff's mechanic's lien and defendant Security Pacific's trust 
deed. After consideration of the parties' briefs, the court 
granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied 
defendant Security Pacific's motion for summary judgment as set 
forth by separate order. Pursuant to the court's rulings, it is 
hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as follows: 
1. The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure dated May 8, 
1990, is reinstated and amended to add the following provisions. 
^ —' " T * V-J 
All other aspects of the May 8, 1990, judgment are unchanged. The 
Amended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure dated May 22, 1991, is 
hereby vacated and superceded by this Judgment. 
2. Plaintiff's mechanic's lien recorded on November 16, 
1988, as Entry No. 4702325 in Book 6081 at Page 2039 in the 
official records of the Salt Lake County Recorder is a valid and 
perfected lien upon the following described property: 
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Lot 1, 
Block 27, Plat "G", Salt Lake City Survey, and 
running thence West 135 feet; thence North 13 0 
feet; thence East 135 feet; thence South 13 0 
feet to the point of beginning. 
3. It is further ordered and decreed that the interests 
in the above property of defendant Security Pacific National Bank 
and First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. as shown by assignments 
recorded May 10, 1989, arising from a trust deed in favor of 
Ameristar Financial Corp. recorded on July 7, 1988, as Entry No. 
4647262 in Book 6045 at Page 980 in the official records of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder are inferior and subordinate to 
plaintiff's mechanic's lien recorded November 16, 1986. 
4. The judgment for attorney's fees heretofore entered 
on May 8, 1990, is augmented to add an additional avrard of 
attorney's fees incurred between the May 8, 1990, judgment and June 
17, 1991, in the sum of $2,420.00. 
DATED this g 0 day of August 1991. 
J7 /7 Jtfdge 
Approved as tcj ztorlril) ^  
Sherman C. Young 
AUG 2 0 £31 
RALPH R. TATE, JR. (#3192) Q 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 278-4747 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
J. LAMAR RICHARDS, ) 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. ) 
DEBRA L. YOUNGMAN, DEBORAH : 
DIAMANTI, AKERISTAR FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, a corporation, ) 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES 
COMPANY, INC., a corporation, : 
SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK, 
FIRST BOSTON MORTGAGE SECURITIES) 
CORP., and JOHN DOES 1-3, 
• 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the court on motions for summary 
judgment filed by plaintiff and defendant Security Pacific National 
Bank. Defendant Security Pacific filed a motion to strike certain 
allegations of plaintiff. All motions were fully briefed and the 
matter was submitted to the court pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code 
of Judicial Administration. 
The court having been fully advised in the premises, 
there appearing to be no disputed issues of material fact, finds 
and concludes as follows: 
1. Plaintiff commenced his work on the subject property 
X'ZIO 
010 to 
ORDER PURSUANT TO: <?<\C5 O ^ ^ 
1. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
2. DEFENDANT SECURITY 
PACIFIC'S CROSS MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
3. DEFENDANT SECURITY 
PACIFIC'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
Civil No. 890904949CN 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
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prior to June 29, 1988, and completed his work on August 30, 1988. 
2. Plaintiff's notice of mechanic's lien was recorded on 
November 16, 1988. 
3 . A Deed of Trust from defendant Youngman to Ar.eristar 
Financial Corporation was recorded July 7, 1988. It was 
subsequently assigned to First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. on 
October 15, 1988. The assignment was recorded May 10, 1989. First 
Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. assigned its Deed of Trust to 
defendant Security Pacific. This Assignment was also recorded May 
10, 1989. As of May 10, 1989, all interests of Ameristar Financial 
Corporation and First Boston Mortgage were vested in defendant 
Security Pacific National Bank. 
4. Based upon the undisputed facts of record and 
equities between the parties, the court concludes that the doctrine 
of equitable subrogation as claimed by defendant Security Pacific 
is not applicable in this case. 
5. Defendant Security Pacific's motion to strike 
references to title insurance and paragraphs 1 and 2 of plaintiff's 
Additional Significant Facts in plaintiff's Reply Memorandum is 
hereby granted. 
6. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
7. Defendant Security Pacific's cross motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
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8. An amendment to the judgment and decree of 
foreclosure shall be entered incorporating the elements of this 
order as they apply to the decree of foreclosure and awarding 
plaintiff such additional attorneys fees as shall be established in 
accordance with Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
9. The order heretofore signed by this court Kay 22, 
1991, entitled "Order on Summary Judgments and Motion to Strike" 
and the "Arended Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure" are hereby 
vacated and superceded by this order and the Amendment to Judgment 
filed herewith. 
10. Except as qualified herein, the other undisputed 
statements of fact as set forth in the parties1 Memoranda in 
support of their respective motions for summary judgment are 
incorporated by reference as findings of fact by this court. 
11. It is further ordered that defendant's Motion for 
Stay of Execution pending the issuance of this Amended Order is 
denied for the reason that said issue is now moot. 
DATED this .y[_> day of August 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ? J u d g e 
ApprcSy^d a s t 
Sherman C. Young 
°-VTJ* 
RALPH R. TATE, JR., P.C. (#3192) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4685 Highland Drive, Suite 202 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: 278-4747 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF 
MAY 8 1930 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
UTAH 
J. LAMAR RICHARDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DEBRA L. YOUNGMAN, DEBORAH 
DIAMANTI, AMERISTAR FINANCIAL 
CORPORATION, a corporation, and 
ASSOCIATES FINANCIAL SERVICES 
COMPANY, INC., a corporation, 
and JOHN DOES 1-5, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE 
OF FORECLOSURE 
Civil No. 890904949CN 
Hon. Pat B. Brian 
The above matter came before the court under the 
provisions of Rule 4-501 on plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The action was brought by plaintiff seeking in part a 
decree of foreclosure with respect to the property which is subject 
matter of this litigation arising out of a mechanic's lien for 
services rendered by plaintiff on the property. All parties have 
been properly served and the default of defendants Ameristar 
Financial Corporation and Associates Financial Services Company, 
Inc. have heretofore been entered. Defendant Diamanti has denied 
having any interest in the real property which is subject matter of 
the foreclosure proceeding. The issues of the financial 
responsibility of defendant Diamanti for any of the obligations 
have been reserved for further proceedings if necessary. 
The matter came before the court on plaintiff's Motion 
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for Summary Judgment, for entry of judgment as against defendant 
Debra L. Youngman, and for entry of a decree of foreclosure as 
against all parties, reserving certain issues pertaining to 
defendant Diamanti. 
The court having considered the papers submitted by the 
parties, including the Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting 
Memorandum, and the Affidavits of plaintiff and plaintiff's 
counsel, being duly advised in the circumstances, good cause 
appearing therefore, hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, AND DECREES as 
follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant Debra L. Youngman for $5,499.50 representing 
the amount due for services rendered subject to plaintiff's 
mechanic's lien; $893.67 representing unpaid interest through April 
15, 1990; plaintiff's court costs to date in the sum of $108.75; 
plaintiff's attorney's fees to date in the sum of $780.00, for a 
total judgment of $7,281.92 together with after-accruing interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of judgment until paid 
and plaintiff's court costs incurred hereafter. It is further 
ORDERED that this judgment shall be augmented by the amount of 
reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collection by 
foreclosure, execution, or otherwise as shall be established by 
affidavit. 
2. The foregoing indebtedness arises from a mechanic's 
lien which constitutes a valid and perfected lien upon the 
following described real property: 
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1 , Bl ock " 27 , Plat "GM , Salt Lake City 
Survey, and running thence West 135 feet; 
thence North 13 0 feet; thence East 135 
feet; thence South 130 feet to the point 
of beginning. 
3 "The court hereby riprroos fliicit thr interest of 
Ameristar I ii lancial corporation and Asson-iatc I liiminr i \\ 1 " erv lies 
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f u r t h e r o r d e r n 1 t h i s cou r t I f f hi1 pi o c e e d s from t h e s h e r i 1" f * s 
c a l l ri in H in I Miff 11 ii nl In ii i" nl Mill in I I I In liiiiiill • 111 r 11 ] r 11 iliuf and 
owinq a s s e t f o r t h h e i u i n , t h e she n i l Llial 1 spec i 1 y t h e amount of 
d e f i c i e n c y in h i s r e t u r n t o be f i l e d h e r e i n , and t h e CleiK of t h e 
( m i l t "iliiJiII mill ui i ill M r u n r y pulqnieirt i r \ m i m i 11 Delnd I  I'IMIIIH jim in 
t o r such d e f i c i e n c y , The p l a i n t i f f OJ iiny other1 p a i t ^ t o t h i s 
a c t i o n ma^ ibeoomf a p u r c h a s p r fit s a i d f- i l l If p l a i n t i f f i s t h e 
p u n h a s e j
 ( p u t . s u n t . , J i n Il I In | n u p e j I \ linill I  I n i iwi in d i ill I  n I In 
plaintiff upon sale, The sheriff shall execute n Certificate of 
S a I (» In t I in piiiH hare r "lln rhrriff •'hall execute a den il In I lie 
purchaser upon expiration ol the ledemption period provided by law. 
Upon the expiration of said redemption period, ail parties in this 
< i I I i ' I II r ' l 1 1 1 J in mi mi | H ' 1 1 i " i ( 1 1 1 I 1 1 I i n mi in in | HI in mi mi i 1 M I I mi i mi mi I 1 i in in i n in in mi mi mi in 1 1 1 in i 1 1 i y ' P f* 
barred an I foreclosed ol a I I lights, claims, and t \n 11 , • 1 
redemption in the property. 
DATKI) t i l l ! /;, d,jy ol ^ p f l l \ l 9 9 0 . 
BY THE COURT: 
5 
NOTICE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
ent and Decree of Foreclosure, postage prepaid, thjs 
i "I 1990, addressed as follows: 
day 
Debra Youngman 
c/o Club Karerra 
3424 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Debra Youngman 
983 East 3rd Avenue? 
Salt Lake City, Ut.tl, HJIu1 
Ameristar Financial Corp. 
c/o C.T. Corporation 
50 West 300 South, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Deborah Diamanti 
225 North Main #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Larry G. Reed, Esq. 
CROWTHER, BEARD & SHAPHREN 
455 South 300 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Associates Financial Services 
c/o Prentice Hall 
185 South State #600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
c?. IX 
Ralph R. Tate, J r. 
••-076 
I. " I I I I H I (i 
FOR ifr.invA • itjzayo|».w -are ly-jg™.79^ 
ymtnt Option ^ ^ t 2 ^ ^ ' gf>*\rf ' Pr«ptym«nt Option ' ^ (%£*y No Prepayment P e n a l t y - Regulcfr FNMA/FHLI 
esj {Hazard Int.] | Mtp Ins | 1 
I Property Streat Address 
983 e . T h i r d Ave. 
City 
Salt Lake 
1 County 
Salt Lake 
I Leftal Description TXttach Wlcriplion Tt n¥eaeaary] 
commence at the Southeast corner Lot 1 Block 27 Plat G 
'Stale 
Ut . 
Zip 
84 10 3 
OSS-
Purpose of Loan \ [Purchase | 1 Construction-Permanent [ ]Construction [ jjRefinance | )Other (Explain) 
Original Cost Present Value (a) jCosl of Imps (b) J Total {a + b} 
s :$ ;$ 
Complete this line 
Construction-Permanent 
or Construction Loan tm 
Lot Value Data 
Year Acquired 
Complete this tine If a Refinance Loan 
_Purpo»e of Refinance 
Year Acquired [Original Cost \Amt Existing Liens ; M o r tgage conS01 i d3 t«i on 
1985 ;,420,00(fc 303,546 [Lower i n t e r e s t r a t e ! 
Describe: Improvements f J made | ] to be ma.3>e 
I Title Will Be Held In What Name(s) 
Debra L. Youngman 
IMannc In WMrt- f»tie Will Be Held 
' A s i n g l f Woman 
I Source of Down Payment and Settlement Charges 
Loan proceeds 
This application Is designed to be completed by the borrower(s) with the lender's assistance The Co-Borrower Section and all other Co-Borrower questions mjs DC 
completed and the appropriate box(es) checked if another person will be Jointly obligated with the Borrower on the loan or the Borrower is relying o* 
from alimony, child support or separate maintenance or on the income or assets of another person as a basis for repayment of the loan, or' L I the Bo' 
ried and resides, or the property is located, in a community property state 
jrrowe- e m-
Co-Borrower 
Name 
Debra L. Youngman 
Age 
33 
School 
Yrs 1 6 
Ag* Sr-oo: 
Present Address 
Street 9 8 3 E . 
No Years 
T h i r d Ave 
ED0*1"' ["""") Rent Present Address 
Street 
I I Own Q>,~. 
Ctty/staie/z.p S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t 8 4 1 0 3 
I on 1 ier address it less than 2 years at present address 
S t r ei e t 
City /State/Zip 
Ctty/'State/Zip 
Former address if less than 2 years at present address 
Street 
Years at former address I JQwn J I Rent 
City/State/Zip 
Years at lor me r address j I Own 
Marital | 1 Married f H Separated 
_ r r n . . - ^ (,ncl •"*9t« divorced 
Status | X I Unmarried widowd) 
«lgT[P»TCQ+OWOWf» 
n/a 
Marital [ ^ M a r r i e d \ [Separated 
_A . I 1 , , . . ('net single divorced 
Status 1 I Unmarried , -
. .H"^" }? ' " ! ' 
Name and Address of Employer 
H=-' i t i -Color A d v e r t i s i n g 
O. Box 64 5 
d e r , Texas 
Years employed in this line 
jol work or profession? 
1 Q years 
Years on this job 4 
11 I Sett Employed' 
Name and Address of Employer Years empk>ve>:* r tmr 
ot work or processor 
y e a -
Years on thrs p : 
1 j Self E m p c n 
•, T i t l e 
Director,Utah Division Advertising 
Type of Business Position/Title Type of Business 
Social Security Number"* 
524-82-5294 i><; 
Home Phone 
363-8503 
Business Phone , 
915-573-0236 
Social Security Number*** Home Phone Business Pro". 
Gross Monthly Income Monthly Housing Expense" Details of Purchase 
Hem 
Base Empl Income 
Overtime 
Bonuses 
Commissions 
Dividends/Interest 
Net Rental Income 
Othert (B*tor« 
eompleitnc a * * nonet 
Ineoma baiow ) 
Total 
Borrower 
$11,500 
$11,500 
Co-Borrower 
$ 
$ 
Total 
$ 11,500 
$11,500 
Rent 
First Mortgage ( M l ) 
Other Financing (P&l) 
Hazard Insurance 
Real Estate Taxes 
Mortgage Insurance 
Homeowners Assn Dues 
Other: 
Total Monthly Pmt 
Utilities 
Total 
MttSENl 
2,083 
83 
271
 f 
$2,437 
400 
$2 ,837 
WIO«"OSCC 1 
L2574^ ] 
a 
I}/} Do Not Complete If Refinance 
% jrchase Price 
b ToU' Ctosino Costs (Est) 
( J 7 \ fi 0 - A 0 P^ epawJ Escrows (Est) 
r U j L S u . O f t ^ l a 4 ^ c ) 
m 
*\ 
e Amount This Mortgage 
I Other Financing 
Hfjffc Other Equity 
L3104 .1 
400 
$ 3,074 
0) Amount of Cash Deposit 
i Closing Costs Paid by Seller 
j Cash Reqd For Closing (Est) 
S 
s 
s 
o 
B—Borrower C—Co-Borrower NOTICE 
Describe Other Income 
Alimony child support, or separate maintenance income need not be revealed it the 
Borrower or Co-Borrower does not choose to have It considered as a basis tor repaying this loan 
If Employed In Current Position For Less Than Two Years. Complete the Following 
Previous Employer/School City/State Type of Business Position/Title Dates From/To 
These Questions Apply To Both Borrower and Co-Borrower 
Are there any outstanding )ucJg>'n#rtts against , r' 
("to win you been declared bankrupt within the pas I 7 years'? 
Haw you had property foreclosed upon or 91 van trite w deed in ecu thereat hi 
last 7 years? 
Are you a party to a law autr? 
Art you obligated to pay alimony, child support 01 sei • - maini 
It any pari ot the down payment borrewtd*'1 
Are you a co-maker or endorser on • note' 
T M W N O 
no 
no 
Jl<2 
lie 
I1Q 
lie 
tjlTe* or M 
Ara yo» • U.S ettar i":i" 
• "no," ara you • tea idem aben? 
M "no," a r a v o u a nerwaaMam alien? 
Explain Otnei Financing w Othaf l-ciony (If any) 
i _i 
fHLMC/FNMA raqulra business cradit raport. signed Federal Income Tax returns tor last two years, and. M available audited Profit and Loss Statement plus balance sheei lor same p* . 
"All Present Monthly Mousing Expenses ot Borrower and Co-Borrower should be listed on a combined basis - —* M *-» 
"•Optional lor FMLMC " ;{ ' ^ » * | *£, 
fMiMr. 65 nrv 10/BC AT Fo- - - ir-j Worms Inc.. 315 Whitney Ave.. New Haven. CT 06511 Atl Rights Reserved 1(800> 243-4545 lt-m I1 231650 PSnmT- W.--T™ -
This fcassmant and f r y applicante supporting achaduiea may be oonyieiso |otnoy py ooen 
t»jlt»c»»nlryp)inedaolriatf»o8i^^ 
(FHLMC t&A/FNMA K t t A ) If me co-borrower section was composed eoout a spouse 
fnamac and unmarried co-oorrowefi • ssew aasaej and 
otiai wise sspareta 8urtomens>aad ftchsdutoa 
etasernent and supporting schedutos aval 
| | Completed Jointly ( " ^ No* Completed 
Liabilities and Pledged Assets 
List any additional names under which credit has previously been received 
AGREEMENT The undersigned sppltes tor the loan indicated in this application to be secured by s trst mortgage or deed of trust on the property described N 
represents that me property will not be used tor any illegal or restricted purpose and that all statements made in this application are true and are made tor a** p 
obtaining t ie loan Verification may be obtained from any source named in this application The original or a copy of this applies bon will be retained by the iende- < 
loan is not granted The undersigned [x\ intend or Q ] do not intend to occupy the property as ttieir primary residence 
|/we fully understand that it is a tederst crime punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both to knowingly make any false statements concerning any of Wm 
pltoaMe under the provisions of Title 16 United States Code Section 1014 
\- ~w*r*<?Zrra*x &•»• 6 /13 /88 _ — 
Bcffffwer s Signature 
I factor* ap lic bl ii 
Co-Borrower s Signsture 
Information for Government Monitoring Purposes 
I'O Be Completed by Interviewer 
TMs apple all on was taken a y 
f x l face so face interview 
\ | by mail 
JflVW' {UM^ 
J Affidavit ana Agreement (by iorto»»r tntf •topfcrty *#tt#r) 
-JftJLtt * • »»-i i , 
COUMTY nr SALT LAKE 
•ivwafaHto DM arferr*) 
) ss 
»lw»«fOa«rtir »m*c) 
Before ma, K I W PLJJU<SFN - a notary public In i 
THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE. STATE OF DTAR 
ftEBRA L. TOUNCMAN 
(referred to herein, whether one or more persons, as "Borrower Affiant"), a n d . 
(referred to herein, whether one or more persons, as "Seller Affiant"), and each such person, being of lawful age and being don i 
according to law, upon oath deposes and makes the applicable statements contained In Section III below, and Borrower Affiant are: : 
Affiant also agree as provided In Section II below 
I. REPRESENTATIONS: 
Representation No. 1 . That Borrower Affiant Is the party named In a promissory note (referred to herein as the "Note"; a 
mortgage, deed of trust, or deed to secure debt (referred to herein as the "Security Instrument"), both bearing date o* . 
JULY 0 1
 f 1QBB , evidencing and eecuring a loan (referred to herein as the "Loan") constituting a ae*- or -
property located at Q83 E 3RD AVE . SALT LAKE CITY. UT 8*103 
l i (Property Address) (referred to herein as the "Property"), the Loan having been made to Borrower Affiant aMEBTCTan FTHAHCIAL CORPORATION. A CORPORATION. ITS SUCCESSORS AND/OR ASSIGNS 
(referred to herein as the "I 
Representation No. 2. That Seller Affiant It the seller of the Property to Borrower Affiant 
Representation No. 3. That the purpose of the Loan Is as shown by X In the appropriate space below 
D to finance Borrower Affiant's purchase of the Property, at a purchase price of $ 
LXK to refinance outstanding debt against the Property 
D for the following purpose 
Representation No. 4. That the financial terms of the transaction constituting or related to the Loan are as follows 
Amount of the First Mortgage on the Property $ 3 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 
Cash Equity (if the Loan Is not a refinancing) $ . 0 0 
Purchase Price of the Property $ . 
Initial Monthly Payment under the Note $ 2 . 5 7 M . 0 0 
There Is no subordinate financing relating to the Property except as specifically set forth immediately below 
Terms of Subordinate Financing 
Amount $ _Ofl 
Interest Rate ,nnn %t> Term months 
Monthly Payment $ JLQ 
Name and address of the holder of such subordinate financing 
Representation No. 5. That Borrower Affiant has not given, conveyed, permitted, or contracted for, or tareed to give 
permit any lien upon the Property to secure a debt or loan, except for any lien connected with subordinate f inance 
Property, as fully disclosed In Representation No 4 above, and the Hen referred to In Representation No 1 above 
Representation No. • That If the Loan Is for the purpose of financing Borrower Affiant's purchase of the Property, no i 
charges relating to, or In connection with, Borrower Affiant's purchase of the Property, such as Interest charges, real e 
hazard insurance premiums, in Mai mortgage Insurance premiums, or of funds to be used for renewal of mortgage i 
relation to the Loan, have been, or will be, paid, funded, or borne by Seller Affiant for or on behalf of Borrower Afftani 
otherwise specifically stated immediately below 
Representation No. 7. As indicated by X In the appropriate apace adjacent to A or B below 
That (if indicated by X In the appropriate space adjacent hereto) Borrower Affiant now occupies the Property as 
Affiant's principal residence, or In good fattn will so occupy tne rroperty, commencing sucn occupancy not late- r« r -
thirty (30) days after this date or (b) thirty (30) days after the Property shall first have become ready for occupant -m 
habitable dwelling, whichever Is later 
D B That (rf Indicated by X In the appropriate apace adjacent hereto) Borrower Affiant does not occupy the Propmrr 
Borrower Affiant's principal residence and does not Intend to do so. 
Initials of Borrower Affiant Initials of Seller Affiant: > o i _ 
LOAIl * 6772112 « - - » — -
•MTIK-1 ram OMG .-cvpm. cuuftr - • _ » M - M , OOUKNRO. jam—» t—~**. 
A. Follower Covenant. 6om - x Affiant agrees thai (If an X la placed m the a ^ 'data apace adjacent to Representation Nc - # 
Of Btctioh I above) (1) K shall i* an additional covenant of the Security httrurr^nt thai Borrower/Amant occupy the proper mm 
provided In iiioh Representation Mo 7A, and (2) failure to ao occupy the property ahat! oonttitute l breach of covenant unor ~ie» 
fcecUHty Inttrumertt thai anal! erttrtie tha Lender, at auccaaaort and aasigns, Id atercJes (ha remedies tor i breach of oovanaar 
a V a r i M In lha iaearfty aiaframaht, 
B. Inducement Agreement Borrower Affiant and Seller Affiant agree and acknowledge that the foregoing Borrower Covenant <r 
applicable), the Rapraaentationa made In Section I above, and the Statements under Oath made In Section III below are made tear 
the purpoae of Inducing the Lander and Its assigns to make or purchase the Loan 
STATEMENTS UNDER OATH 
A. By Borrower Affiant. Borrower Affiant hereby deposes and says upon oath that those Representations referred to and se* torrr 
In Section I above as Representations Nos 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, and (If applicable) Representation No 7A are true and correct 
B. By Seller Affiant Seller Affiant hereby deposes and says upon oath that those Representations referred to and set forr 
Section I above as Representations Nos 2 and 6 are true and correct, and that Representations Nos 1,3, 4, 5. and (if appfacaote* 
Representation No 7A, as referred to and aet forth in such Section, are true and correct to the best of Seller Affiant's knowledge 
Information, and belief 
JWo&lA ^J^>^r^ 
DEBRA L. YOtfff&lArl u 
(Signature) 
(Seller Affiant) 
(Signature) 
(Borrower Affiant) 
(Signature) 
(Borrower Affiant) 
(Signal *r« 
(Seller Arte-? 
(Signat.r= 
(Borrower Affia~* 
(Signal vre 
(Borrower Affa^t 
(Signature) 
(Borrower Affiant) 
(Signaler* 
(Borrower Affiart 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this 1st . day of JULY 1988 
My commission expires 
3/8/92 
Notary public in and for 
-SDRsrr, in 
CERTIFICATE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY LENDER 
The Lender hereby represents to and certifies for the reliance of, any party to which the Loan hereafter is sold or assigned that af cr me 
applicable representations and statements contained in Sections I and III above are true and correct to the best of the Lender's knowteooe 
information, and belief In addition, the Lender hereby acknowledges and accepts the Borrower covenant (if applicable) and the Induceoe"* 
JSgreement, aet forth, respectively in Paragraphs A and B of Section II above 
AMCRISTAR FINANCIAL.CORPORATION 
4 
ove i 
This form should be executed by the borrower(s), property aeller(s) ar.d lender on rhe date the Loan is ciosed ) 
ADVISORY NOTICE 
4 any statement in the foregoing Affidavit and Agreement is made under oath by Borrower Affiant or Seller Affiant with knowledge that sucr 
statement la false, the person making such false statement may be subject to civil and criminal penalties under applicable law 
n addition, any breach of the covenant by Borrower Affiant relating to occupancy of the Property (as aet forth in Paragraph A of Sector i 
•bova) will entitle the holder of the Note to exercise Its remedies for breach of covenant under the Security Instrument Such reme£»es 
nclude, without limitation, requiring immediate payment In full of the remaining Indebtedness under the Loan together with all other sums 
•ecurad by the Security Instrument, and exercise of power of sate or other applicable foreclosure remedies, to the extent ano; I rv t^ raamer 
iuthorized by the Security Instrument - *- *• - ^ «^ 
Corpora* CANARY - franc* PINK - Sato QOLDENROO LOAN # 6772112 _ . 
dflWHT 
Lender Nama^ 
Ameristar Financial Corp. 
CtwwrABanti " - •"• ' ' ' ' "" 
!*516 South 7th East #340 , Hjrray , UT 
Borrows Nam* 
YOUNGMAN, Debra 
Property Address 
983 E . 3rd A v e . , S a l t Lake, UT 84103 , 
Lender Number 
Connect Number 
Lender Loan Numtoer 
111-6772112 
Fannie Mae Loer *K 
Section 1-Loan Characteristics (Check all Applicable Categories) 
Loan Type 
n FHA 
I i VA 
X X 1st Mon P Fixed Rate 
1 1 ?nri Mntt X ARM Plan 
XXConv No I B L T 
Loan Terms 
Original Lo*r< 
1320000. 
trmmi Next 
9 . 0 0 
*vrt*> Monthly |D»U 0' 
Installmant INOIC 
' 2 5 7 4 . 7 9 
! Buydown 
J_ 
360 
Loan Purpose 
D Purchase 
5C Refinance 
If Refinance. Purpose 
Occupancy 
8 Primary Single-Family 
Owner Occupied 
D Second Home 
D S . f . Investment 
G 2-4 Family Investment 
O 2-4 Family Owner Occuptec 
Section 2—Underwriting Information 
Sates Price Appraised Value 
• N/A •500.100.00 
Loan to Value 
63.99 * 
What is combined Loan-to Value Ratio? 
Appraiser Name & Company Name 
William E. Liefferth 
Stable Monthly Income 
Win. 
Borrower Co Borrower 
B a * Income 1 1 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0
 t 
Other Income $ • 
Positive Cash 
Flow (Subject 
Property) • • 
Total Income t 1 1 . 5 0 0 . 0 0 » 
Ratios 
PrimarY Housing Expense /Income 
Total Obligation/income 
Investment Property Only 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio 
; 1 Yes H 
_* 
Mo 
E. Lifferth 
Total 
t 11,500. 
1 
• 
t 11,500 
2 7 . 0
 % 
2 8 . 0
 % 
% 
00 
JL° 
Property Type 
1 ' Condominium Project Type 
1 I PUD Project Tyoe 
and Assoc. 
Underwriter Name 
Angela K. 
Proposed Monthly Payments 
Borrower's Primary Residence 
First Mortgage P&l 
Second Mortgage Pfcrl 
Hazard Insurance 
Taxes 
Mortgage Insurance 
Home Owner Association Fees 
Other 
Total Primary Housing Expense 
Other Obligations 
Negative Cash Flow (Subject Property) 
All Other Monthly Payments 
Total All Monthly Payments 
D De Minimus PUD 
Other 
SFD 
Garza 
• __2S24.79 
$ 
• _ 
• _ 
• _ 
• _ 
$ _ 
• _ 
$_ 
80.00 
450.00 
2l?A "7Q 
8CK00 
3 1 8 4 . 7 9 
Section 3—Lander's Underwriting Comments 
Good r a t i o s , very low LTV, good cred i t , good job s t a b i l i t y , house i s part of the Utah-
State Histor ica l Society . 
Section 4 —Exhibits Submitted in Addition to Fannie Mae Standard Document Requirements 
j j l_4_ 
2 5 
3- IT 
Section 6-Lender's Contact (Person to Whom Correspondence Should Be Directed) 
Name 
Angela K. Garza 
Title 
Underwriter 
S-O.U,. Q fa
 C3>to,l>t-CL 
Telephone No. 
Date 
619/492-1556 
6-28-88 
L0 043 (8-86)( 
*:21S" 
/\ MFRISTAR L ° A K -**rUS AND CONDITIONS 
runnrc TII 
LOAN #: 1 1 1 - 6 7 7 2 1 1 2 BRANCH: & a l t Lake C i t y 
NAME: YOUNGMAN DATE SUBMITTED: * K S U » . 6 - 2 6 - 6 6 
The Above Referenced Loan I t : 
Q Approved X© Subject to the following conditions Approval expires on: 
D Suspended for the following Suspended Hems must be rec'd by: 
D Declined/Cancelled (see comments) 
Loan Amt: $ 3 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 interest Rate: JttTbv* Term: 30_ Yrs 
XX 07D N70/0 2nd home D Purchase 30 Refi D Cash Out B No Cash Back 
LTV ° 4 - ° % (W/2nd) % O 1st Mtge D 2nd Mtge Loan Program: T R - 1 
D Fixed Rate D Buydown XX One Yr. ARM D Other: / ] ( IWPfiUhdzL 
A. D Subject to Mortgage Insurance Approval °/t> Coverage PMI Co.: 
B. D 'Evidence of Sale/CLSG of Property at: 
Minimum net proceeds: $ . 
C. D *2nd Mtg. in the amount of $ @ $ /Mo. to be 
in compliance with program guidelines 
D. D Evidence that the following accounts have been paid in full prior to or at the time of closing: 
Signed/Dated: Original Application/1003 _ _ _ _ _ Final 1003 K 'Y V Y V \ _ ^ 
F. D Project Approval: FNMA FHLMC 
G. D 'Satisfactory explanation for credit history at:. 
H. D 'Satisfactory explanation for inquiries on credit report: 
I. D 'Satisfactory credit history from: 
J. D 'Satisfactory explanation of source of funds in account a t . 
K. D 'VOE: 
L. D 'VOD: 
M. D 'Copy of current: paystub W-2 for: 
N. D Signed/Dated: tax returns P&L for: 19 , 19 19 
O. D 'Copy of lease/rental agreement for: 
P. D FHA/VA conditions as attached 
O. D Evidence/Compliance with appraisal/CRV/Conditional Commitment requirements 
R. D 'Clear Final Inspection with two sets of photos (3 with mortgage insurance) 
S. D 'Satisfactory field review by an approved appraiser (} 
<S&t. 63 Provide recording information on the contract of sale shoving as item 015 on f', >—• 
U D the preliminary t i t l e report. >-_ 
<&% E Have appraiser resign page two of letter dated June 2Ath reparding aririiflntaa.? 
W. D comparables. Also have him sipn short mv(>r Ipffpr ht> f>nr'\n<zf>A in f -Mp. (3* *> 
X. B Escrow to certify sufficient funds fn rlngp. ^ 
1 Appraiser to supply one additional spf nf rnmp plrtnrps fnr rnmps ill thru #1? ~~ 
2. E NO CASH OUT " 
$&*< X Letter from borrower regarding reason for refinance. 
The following Hems ere also required prior to closing: 
^ f £ & (xj Acceptable title binder/prelim 04. D Acceptable termite Inspection/Clearance 
02. D Acceptable survey/plat <^^G&r-Q Acceptable hazard insurance policy 
03. D Flood Certification 06. D Acceptable evidence of flood insurance 
Underwriting Comments: 
• W " * * ^ 3 
Corporate 
», Q /TV»_* Ut£^* of *W2 QO 6-28-88 Angela Rw Garlax °"* **s*m™ 
Clients Notified of conditions on: by: 
'Must be cleared by Underwriter prior to loan closing ^ _ V w i 
LO 200 (1/W) 
Exhibit 7 
Rule 3 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 4(b) is court. If the motions are not filed in a timely 
added to the list of those rules that the appel- manner, the appellant may not take advantage 
late court may not suspend. The former list of of Rule 4(b) that allows 30 days from the dispo-
rules that the appellate court could not sus- sition of the motion to file the appeal. Both 
pend concerned procedures and time limits appellate courts treat the failure to file post-
that confer jurisdiction upon the court. Under judgment motions in a timely manner as a ju-
Rule 4(b), the post-judgment motions listed risdictional defect. Burgers v. Meredith, 652 
must be filed in a timely manner in the trial P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Timely filing. sion of the time limitation contained in Rule 
When a motion for summary disposition was 10, Utah R. App. P. Bailey v. Adams, 798 P.2d 
clearly meritorious, it would support a suspen- 1142 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
TITLE II. 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
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party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, together 
with the docketing fee, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon receipt of the 
copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be docketed 
under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appellant identi-
fied as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appellant, such 
name shall be added to the title. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The designa-
tion of parties is changed to conform to the des-
ignation of parties in the federal appellate 
courts 
The rule is amended to make clear that the 
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-ap-
peal" does not eliminate liability for payment 
of the filing and docketing fees But for the 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of record 
Attorney fees 
Denial of intervention 
Dismissal by trial court 
Filing fees 
Filing of notice 
Final order or judgment 
Judgment nunc pro tunc 
Motion to strike 
New trial 
Partial judgment 
Postjudgment orders 
Purpose of notice 
Review in equity cases 
Summary judgment 
Unsigned minute entry 
Compiler's Notes. — All of the following 
annotations are taken from cases decided un-
der former Rule 3, R Utah S Ct 
Absence of record. 
There was nothing for the court to review 
where the alleged error was not made part of 
the record Powers v. Gene's Bldg Materials, 
Inc, 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977) 
Attorney fees. 
Where plaintiff was entitled to attorney fees 
order of filing, the cross-appellant would have 
been the appellant and so should be required to 
pay the established fees 
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, ap-
peals from, § 78-4-11 
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120 
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51 
by law, he was entitled to attorney fees in-
curred on appeal in defending his judgment 
without the necessity of having to file a cross 
appeal Coates v American Economy Ins Co , 
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981), Wallis v Thomas, 
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981) 
Denial of intervention. 
Order denying with prejudice an application 
for intervention was appealable Tracy v Uni-
versity of Utah Hosp , 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 
1980) 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on 
the merits of the issues under Rule 4Kb), 
U R C P , and an order of dismissal without 
prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), U R C P , are 
final adjudications of the issues and the time 
for appeal under this rule begins to run with 
the entry of the order Sterner v State, 27 Utah 
2d 284, 495 P.2d 809 (1972) 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was 
not a final judgment subject to appeal Little v 
Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979) 
Dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs ac-
tion was appealable where the trial court's rul-
ing went to the legal merits of any cause that 
plaintiff may have framed Bowles v. State ex 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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final judgment from which an appel could be 
taken J.B & RE Walker, Inc v Thayn, 17 
Utah 2d 120, 405 P 2d 342 (1965) 
Where court granted one defendant's motion 
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default 
ludgment in favor of that defendant on his 
counterclaim, but action against other defen-
dants and one defendant's counterclaim re-
mained alive, court's order was not final and 
an appeal from it would be dismissed Kennedy 
v New Era Indus , lnc , 600 P 2d 534 (Utah 
1979) 
A judgment which disposes of fewer than all 
of the causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs 
complaint is not a final judgment from which 
an appeal mav be taken Salt Lake Cit> Corp 
^ Layton, 600 P 2d 538 (Utah 1979)' 
A partial summar> judgment is not gener-
allv a final judgment and hence it is not ap-
pealable under the limitations prescribed bv 
this rule South Shores Concession, Inc v 
State, 600 P 2d 550 (Utah 1979) 
District court order setting aside certain pro-
visions in a default decree of divorce and pro-
viding for a further hearing on the matter was 
not a final ruling from which an appeal could 
be taken Pearson v Pearson, 641 P 2d 103 
(Utah 1982) 
Postjudgment orders. 
An order vacating a judgment is not a final 
order from which an appeal can be taken pur-
suant to this rule Van Wagenen v Walker, 
597 P 2d 1327 (Utah 1979) 
The final judgment rule does not preclude 
review of postjudgment orders, such orders 
were independently subject to the test of final-
ity, according to their own substance and ef-
fect Cahoon v Cahoon, 641 P 2d 140 (Utah 
1982) 
Purpose of notice. 
The object of a notice of appeal is to advise 
the opposite partv that an appeal has been 
taken from a specific judgment in a particular 
case Nunley v Stan Katz Real Estate, lnc , 15 
Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964) 
Review in equit> cases. 
In the appeal of an equity case the Supreme 
Court mav weigh the facts as well as review 
the law, but will reverse on the facts onlv when 
the evidence clearlv preponderates against the 
findings of the trial court Cnmmins v 
Simonds, 636 P 2d 478 (Utah 1981) 
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in 
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give 
due deference to the trial court's decision and 
reverse only when the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the trial court's findings 
Jensen v Brown, 639 P 2d 150 (Utah 1981) 
Summary judgment 
Order setting aside summary judgment was 
not final judgment from which aggrieved per-
son might appeal as matter of right Jensen v 
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P 2d 906 (1968) 
Order denying a motion for summar> judg-
ment was not a final order and was not appeal-
able Denison v Crown Toyota Motors, Inc , 
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977) 
A summary judgment in favor of one defen-
dant alone does not constitute a final order of 
judgment where the action against the remain-
ing defendant remains alive Neider v State 
Dep't of Transp , 665 P 2d 1306 (Utah 1983) 
Unsigned minute entr>. 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute 
an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg-
ment for purposes of appeal Wilson v Man-
ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982), Utah State 
Tax Comm'n v Erekson, 714 P 2d 1151 (Utah 
1986), Sather v Gross, 727 P 2d 212 (Utah 
1986), Ahlstrom v Anderson, 728 P 2d 979 
(Utah 1986) 
An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
tute a final order for purposes of appeal State 
v Crowley, 737 P 2d 198 (Utah 1987) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
A L R 4th 939 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
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shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Attorney fees. 
Cross-appeal. 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Filing of notice. 
Filing with county clerk. 
Final order or judgment. 
Post-judgment motions. 
Premature notice. 
Reconsideration of order. 
Timeliness of notice. 
—Date of notice. 
Attorney fees. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Cross-appeal. 
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of 
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-ap-
peal, a respondent may not attack the judg-
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti 
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided 
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4). 
Extension of time to appeal. 
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the 
court power to extend a time limit where a fail-
ure to act in time is due to excusable neglect 
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., autho-
rizing the court to relieve from final judgment 
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dence, internal confidential publications, office 
memoranda, university press publications, and 
publications of the state historical society. 1979 
37-5-2. Commiss ion to establ ish, operate and 
maintain. 
The commission shall establish, operate and main-
tain a publication collection, a bibliographic control 
6ystem and depositories as provided in this act. 1979 
37-5-3. Depos i t of copies of publ icat ions with 
commiss ion . 
(1) Each state agency shall deposit with the com-
mission copies of each state publication issued by it in 
such number as shall be specified by the state librar-
ian. 
(2) Each political subdivision shall deposit with 
the commission two copies of each state publication 
issued by it. 
(3) The commission shall forward two copies of 
each s tate publication deposited with it by a state 
agency to the Library of Congress, one copy to the 
state archivist, at least one copy to each depository-
library, and retain two copies. 
(4) The commission shall forward one copy of each 
s ta te publication deposited with it by a political sub-
division to the state archivist and retain the other 
copy. 
(5) Each s tate agency shall deposit with the com-
mission two copies of audiovisual materials , and tape 
or disc recordings issued by it for bibliographic listing 
and retention in the state library collection. Mate-
rials not deemed by the commission to be of major 
public interest will be listed but no copies will be 
required for deposit. 1979 
37-5-4. List of state agenc ies ' state publ icat ions 
— Distribution. 
The commission shall publish a list of each s tate 
agency's s tate publications, which shall provide ac-
cess by agency, author, t i t le, subject and such other 
means as the commission may provide. The list shall 
be published periodically and distributed to deposi-
tory libraries, s tate agencies, s tate officers, members 
of the Legislature and other libraries selected by the 
commission, with at least an annual cumulation. 
Each s tate agency shall furnish the commission and 
the state archivist a complete list of its state publica-
tions for the previous year, annually. 1979 
37-5-5. Des ignat ion as deposi tory l ibrary. 
Upon application, a library in this s tate may be 
designated as a complete or selective depository li-
brary by the commission. 1979 
37-5-6. Contract to provide facil it ies and service 
— Complete depository libraries — Se-
lective depository libraries. 
To be designated as a depository library, a library 
must contract with the commission to provide ade-
quate facilities for the storage and use of state publi-
cations, to render reasonable service without charge 
to patrons and reasonable access to state publica-
tions. A complete depository library shall receive at 
least one copy of all state publications issued by state 
agencies. A selective depositor}' library shall receive 
those state publications issued by state agencies per-
t inent to its selection profile and those specifically 
requested by the library. 1979 
37-5-7. Micrographics and other copying and 
transmission techniques . 
The commission may use micrographics or other 
copying or transmission techniques to meet the needs 
of the depository system. 1979 
37-5-8. Rules and regulat ions — Standards . 
The commission may adopt rules and regulations 
necessary to implement and administer the provi-
sions of this act including standards which must be 
met by libraries to obtain and retain a designation as 
a depository library. 1979 
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Chapter 
1. Mechanics' Liens. 
2. Miscellaneous Liens. 
3. Lessors' Liens. 
4. Common Carriers ' Liens. 
5. Judgment Lien — United States Courts. 
6. Federal Tax Liens. 
7. Hospital Lien Law. 
8. Self-service Storage Facilities. 
9. Penal ty for Wrongful Lien. 
10. Oil, Gas and Mining Liens. 
CHAPTER 1 
MECHANICS' LIENS 
Section 
38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act. 
38-1-2. "Contractors" and "subcontractors" de-
fined. 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be at-
tached. 
38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and subdi-
visions — Franchises, fixtures, and ap-
purtenances. 
38-1-5. Priority — Over other encumbrances. 
38-1-6. Priority over claims of creditors of original 
contractor or subcontractor. 
38-1-7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording — 
Service on owner of property. 
38-1-8. Liens on several separate properties in one 
claim. 
38-1-9. Notice imparted by record 
38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal 
footing regardless of time of filing. 
38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens — 
Action for debt not affected. 
38-1-12. Repealed. 
38-1-13 Part ies — Joinder — Intervention 
38-1-14. Decree — Order of satisfaction. 
38-1-15. Sale — Redemption — Disposition of pro-
ceeds. 
38-1-16. Deficiency judgment. 
38-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs and attor-
neys' fee to subcontractor. 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. 
38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor — Subcon-
tractor's lien not affected. 
38-1-20. When contract price not payable in cash — 
Notice. 
38-1-21. Advance payments — Effect on subcontrac-
tor's lien. 
38-1-22. Advance payments under terms of contract 
— Effect on liens. 
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials fur-
nished, except for purchase price. 
38-1-24. Cancellation of record — Penalty. 
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Section 
38-1-25. Ahuse of lien right — Penalty. 
38-1-26. Assignment of lien 
38-1-1. Public buildings not subject to act. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to 
any public building, structure or improvement. 1953 
38-1-2. "Contractors" and "subcontractors" de-
fined. 
Whoever shall do work or furnish materials by con-
tract, express or implied, with the owner, as in this 
chapter provided, shall be deemed an original con-
tractor, and all other persons doing work or furnish-
ing materials shall be deemed subcontractors. 1953 
38-1-3. Those entitled to lien — What may be 
attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons per-
forming any services or furnishing or renting any 
materials or equipment used in the construction, al-
teration, or improvement of any building or structure 
or improvement to any premises in any manner and 
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifica-
tions, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or superin-
tendence, or who have rendered other like profes-
sional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a lien 
upon the property upon or concerning which they 
have rendered service, performed labor, or furnished 
or rented materials or equipment for the value of the 
service rendered, labor performed, or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively, 
whether at the instance of the owner or of any other 
person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, or 
otherwise. This lien shall attach only to such interest 
as the owner may have in the property. 1987 
38-1-4. Amount of land affected — Lots and sub-
divisions — Franchises, fixtures, and 
appurtenances. 
The liens granted by this chapter shall extend to 
and cover so much of the land whereon such building, 
structure, or improvement shall be made as may be 
necessary for convenient use and occupation of the 
land. In case any such building shall occupy two or 
more lots or other subdivisions of land, such lots or 
subdivisions shall be considered as one for the pur-
poses of this chapter. The liens provided for in this 
chapter shall attach to all franchises, privileges, ap-
purtenances, and to all machinery and fixtures, per-
taining to or used in connection with any such lands, 
buildings, structures, or improvements. 1987 
38-1-5. Priority — Over other encumbrances. 
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, 
and take effect as of, the time of the commencement 
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the 
structure or improvement, and shall have priority 
over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which 
may have attached subsequently to the time when 
the building, improvement or structure was com-
menced, work begun, or first material furnished on 
the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other en-
cumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and 
which was unrecorded at the time the building, struc-
ture or improvement was commenced, work begun, or 
first material furnished on the ground. 1953 
38-1-6. Priority over claims of creditors of origi-
nal contractor or subcontractor. 
No attachment, garnishment or levy under an exe-
cution upon any money due to an original contractor 
from the owner of any property subject to lien under 
this chapter shall be valid as against any lien of a 
subcontractor or materialman, and no such attach-
ment, garnishment or levy upon any money due to a 
subcontractor or materialman from the contractor 
shall be valid as against any lien of a laborer em-
ployed by the day or piece 1953 
38-1 -7. Notice of claim — Contents — Recording 
— Service on owner of property. 
(D Every original contractor within 100 days after 
the completion of his contract, and except as provided 
in this section, every person other than the original 
contractor who claims the benefit of this chapter 
within 80 days after furnishing the last material or 
performing the last labor for or on any land, building, 
improvement, or structure shall file for record with 
the county recorder of the county in which the prop-
erty, or some part of the property, is situated, a writ-
ten notice to hold and claim a lien. 
(21 This notice shall contain a statement setting 
forth the following information: 
(a) the name of the reputed owner if known or, 
if not known, the name of the record owrner; 
(b) the name of the person by whom he was 
employed or to whom he furnished the material; 
(c) the time when the first and last labor was 
performed, or the first and last material was fur-
nished; 
(d) a description of the property, sufficient for 
identification; and 
(e) the signature of the lien claimant or his 
authorized agent, and the date signed. 
(3) Within 30 days after filing the notice of lien, 
the lien claimant shall deliver or mail by certified 
mail to either the reputed owner or record owner of 
the real property a copy of the notice of lien. If the 
record owner's current address is not readily avail-
able, the copy of the claim may be mailed to the last-
known address of the record owner, using the names 
and addresses appearing on the last completed real 
property assessment rolls of the county where the af-
fected property is located. Failure to deliver or mail 
the notice of lien to the reputed owner or record 
owner precludes the lien claimant from an award of 
costs and attorneys' fees against the reputed owner or 
record owner in an action to enforce the lien. 
(4) When a subcontractor or any person furnishes 
labor or material as stated in Subsections (1) through 
(3> at the request of an original contractor, then the 
final date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold 
and claim a lien for a subcontractor or a person fur-
nishing labor or materia! at tht- request of an original 
contractor is 80 days after completion of the original 
contract of the original contractor. 1987 
38-1-8. Liens on several separate properties in 
one claim. 
Liens against two or more buildings or other im-
provements owned by the same person may be in-
cluded in one claim; but in such case the person filing 
the claim must designate the amount claimed to be 
due to him on each of such buildings or other im-
provements. 1987 
38-1-9. Notice imparted by record. 
(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index 
maintained for that purpose. 
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all 
persons are considered to have notice of the claim. 
1987 
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38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on 
equal footing regardless of time of fil-
ing. 
The hens for work and labor done or materia? fur-
nished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an 
equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice 
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of per-
forming such work and labor or furnishing such ma-
terial. 1953 
38-1-11. Enforcement — Time for — Lis pendens 
— Action for debt not affected. 
Actions to enforce the liens herein provided for 
must be begun within twelve months after the com-
pletion of the original contract, or the suspension of 
work thereunder for a period of thirty days. Within 
the twelve months herein mentioned the hen claim-
ant shall file for record with the county recorder of 
each county in which the hen is recorded a notice of 
the pendency of the action, in the manner provided in 
actions affecting the title or right to possession of real 
property, or the hen shall be void, except as to per-
sons who have been made parties to the action and 
persons having actual knowledge of the commence-
ment of the action, and the burden of proof shall be 
upon the lien claimant and those claiming under him 
to show such actual knowledge. Nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed to impair or affect the right 
of any person to whom a debt may be due for any 
work done or materials furnished to maintain a per-
sonal action to recover the same 1953 
38-1-12. Repealed. 1981 
38-1-13. Parties — Joinder — Intervention. 
Lienors not contesting the claims of each other may 
join as plaintiffs, and when separate actions are com-
menced the court may consolidate them and make all 
persons having claims filed parties to the action. 
Those claiming hens who fail or refuse to become par-
ties plaintiff may be made parties defendant, and any 
one not made a party may at any time before the final 
hearing intervene. 1953 
38-1-14. Decree — Order of satisfaction. 
In every case in which hens are claimed against the 
same property the decree shall provide for their satis-
faction in the following order: 
(1) Subcontractors who are laborers or me-
chanics working by the day or piece, but without 
furnishing materials therefor, 
(2> All other subcontractors and all material-
men; 
(3) The original contractors. 1953 
38-1-15. Sale — Redempt ion — Disposi t ion of 
proceeds . 
The court shall cause the property to be sold in 
satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case of 
foreclosure of mortgages, subject to the same right of 
redemption If the proceeds of sale after the payment 
of costs shall not be sufficient to satisfy the whole 
amount of liens included in the decree, then such pro-
ceeds shall be paid in the order above designated, and 
pro rata to the persons claiming in each class where 
the sum realized is insufficient to pay the persons of 
such class in full. Any excess shall be paid to the 
owner. 1953 
38-1-16. Deficiency judgment. 
Every person whose claim is not satisfied as herein 
provided may have judgment docketed for the balance 
unpaid, and execution therefor against the party per-
sonally liable. 1953 
38-1-17. Costs — Apportionment — Costs and 
attorneys' fee to subcontractor. 
As between the owner and the contractor the court 
shall apportion the costs according to the right of the 
case, but in all cases each subcontractor exhibiting a 
lien shall have his costs awarded to him. including 
the costs of preparing and recording the notice of 
claim of hen and such reasonable attorney's fee as 
may be incurred in preparing and recording said no-
tice of claim of hen 1961 
38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. 
In any action brought to enforce any hen under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to re-
cover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
1961 
38-1-19. Payment by owner to contractor — 
S u b c o n t r a c t o r ' s lien not affected. 
When any subcontractor shall have actually begun 
to furnish labor or materials for which he is entitled 
to a lien no payment to the original contractor shall 
impair or defeat such lien; and no alteration of any 
contract shall affect any lien acquired under the pro-
visions of this chapter. 1953 
38-1-20. When contract price not payable in 
cash — Notice. 
As to all hens, except that of the contractor, the 
whole contract price shall be payable in money, ex-
cept as herein provided, and shall not be diminished 
by any prior or subsequent indebtedness, offset or 
counterclaim in favor of the owner and against the 
contractor, except when the owner has contracted to 
pay otherwise than in cash, in which case the owner 
shall post in a conspicuous place on the premises a 
statement of the terms and conditions of the contract 
before materials are furnished or labor is performed, 
which notice must be kept posted, and when so posted 
shall give notice to all partie> interested of the terms 
and conditions of the contract. Any person willfully 
tearing down or defacing such notice is guilty of a 
misdemeanor. 1953 
38-1-21. Advance payments — Effect on subcon-
tractor's lien. 
No payment made prior to the time when the same 
is due under the terms and conditions of the contract 
shall be valid for the purpose of defeating, diminish-
ing or discharging a m lien in favor of any person 
except the contractor, but as to any such hen such 
payment shall be deemed as if not made, notwith-
standing that the contractor to whom it was paid ma\ 
thereafter abandon his contract or be or become in-
debted tc the ownei for damages for nonperformance 
of his contract or otherwise. 1953 
38-1-22. Advance payments under terms of con-
tract — Effect on liens. 
The subcontractors' hens provided for in this chap-
ter shall extend to the full contract price, but if at the 
time of the commencement to do work or furnish ma-
terials the owner has paid upon the contract, in accor-
dance with the terms thereof, any portion of the con-
tract price, either in money or property, the hen of 
the contractor shall extend only to such unpaid bal-
ance, and the lien of any subcontractor who has no-
tice of such payment shall be limited to the unpaid 
balance of the contract price. No part of the contract 
price shall by the terms of any contract be made pay-
able, nor shall the same or any part thereof be paid in 
advance of the commencement of the work, for the 
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purpose of evading or defeating the provisions of this 
chapter. 1953 
38-1-23. Creditors cannot reach materials fur-
nished, except for purchase price. 
Whenever materials have been furnished for use in 
the construction, alteration or repair of any building, 
work or other improvement mentioned in Section 
38-1-3 such materials shall not be subject to attach-
ment, execution or other legal process to enforce any 
debt due by the purchaser of such materials, other 
than a debt due for the purchase money thereof, so 
long as in good faith the same are about to be applied 
to the construction, alteration or repair of such build-
ing or improvement. 1953 
38-1-24. Cancellation of record — Penalty. 
The claimant of any lien filed as provided herein, 
on the payment of the amount thereof together with 
the costs incurred and the fees for cancellation, shall 
at the request of any person interested in the prop-
erty charged therewith cause said lien to be canceled 
of record within ten days from the request, and upon 
failure to so cancel his lien within the time aforesaid 
shall forfeit and pay to the person making the request 
the sum of $20 per day until the same shall be can-
celed, to be recovered in the same manner as other 
debts. 1953 
38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty. 
Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for 
record a claim of lien against any property, which 
contains a gTeater demand than the sum due him. 
with the intent to cloud the title, or to exact from the 
owner or person liable by means of such excessive 
claim of lien more than is due him, or to procure any 
advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty of a misde-
meanor. 1953 
38-1-26. Assignment of lien. 
All liens under this chapter shall be assignable as 
other choses in action, and the assignee may com-
mence and prosecute actions thereon in his own name 
in the manner herein provided. 1953 
CHAPTER 2 
MISCELLANEOUS LIENS 
Section 
38-2-1. Lien on livestock — For feed and care. 
38-2-2. Liens of hotels and boardinghouse keepers. 
38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal property — 
Lien subject to rights of secured parties 
38-2-3.1. Special lien on personal property for ser-
vices rendered — General lien of dry 
cleaning establishments, laundries, and 
shoe repair shops. 
38-2-3.2. Sale of unclaimed personal property. 
38-2-4. Disposal of property by lienholder — Proce-
dure. 
38-2-5. Action for deficiency. 
38-2-1. Lien on livestock — For feed and care. 
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle, 
tavern keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any 
domestic animals shall be entrusted for the purpose 
of feeding, herding or pasturing shall have a lien 
upon such animals for the amount that may be due 
him for such feeding, herding or pasturing, and is 
authorized to retain possession of such animals until 
such amount is paid. 1953 
38-2-2. Liens of hotels and boardinghouse 
keepers. 
Every innkeeper, hotel keeper, boardinghouse or 
lodgmghouse keeper shall have a lien on the baggage 
and other property in and about such inn belonging to 
or under control of his guests or boarders for the 
proper charge,^ due him for their accommodation, 
board and lodging, for money paid for or advanced to 
them, and for such other extras as are furnished at 
their request. The innkeeper, hotel keeper, boarding-
house or lodgmghouse keeper may detain such bag-
gage and other property until the amount of such 
charge is paid, and the baggage and other property 
shall not be exempt from attachment or execution 
until the hotel or boardinghouse keeper's lien and the 
costs of enforcing it are satisfied. 1953 
38-2-3. Repairman's lien on personal property 
— Lien subject to rights of secured 
parties. 
Every person who shall make, alter or repair, or 
bestow labor upon, any article of personal property at 
the request of the owner or other person entitled to 
possession thereof shall have a lien upon such article 
for the reasonable value of the labor performed and 
materials furnished and used in making such article 
or in altering or repairing the same, and may retain 
possession thereof until the amount so due is paid: 
provided such lien and right to possession shall be 
subject and subordinate to the rights and interests of 
any secured partie.- in such personal property unless 
such secured party has requested such person to 
make, alter or repair or bestow labor upon such prop-
erty. 1977 
38-2-3.1. Special lien on personal property for 
services rendered — General lien of 
dry cleaning establishments, laun-
dries, and shoe repair shops. 
Every person who, while lawfully in possession of 
an article of personal property, renders any service to 
the owner or owners thereof, by labor or skill per-
formed upon said personal property at the request or 
order of said owner, has a special lien thereon, depen-
dent on possession, for the compensation, if any, 
which is due to him from the owner or owners for 
such service; and every laundry proprietor, person 
conducting a laundry business, dry cleaning estab-
lishment, proprietor and person conducting a dry 
cleaning establishment, shoe repair establishment 
proprietor and person conducting a shoe repair estab-
lishment has a general lien, dependent on possession, 
upon all personal property in his hands belonging to a 
customer, for the balance due him from such cus-
tomer for laundry work, and for the balance due him 
for dry cleaning work, and for the balance due him for 
shoe repair work; but nothing in this section shall be 
construed to confer a lien in favor of a wholesale dry 
cleaner on materials received from a dry cleaning es-
tablishment proprietor or a person conducting a dry 
cleaning establishment. The terms "person" and "pro-
prietor" as used in this section shall include an indi-
vidual, firm, partnership, association, corporation 
and company. 1953 
38-2-3.2. Sale of unclaimed personal property. 
(A) Any garments, clothing, shoes, wearing ap-
parel or household good.-, remaining in the possession 
of a person, on which cleaning, pressing, glazing, 
laundry or washing or repair work has been done or 
upon which alterations or repairs have been made or 
on which materials or supplies have been used or fur-
nished by said person holding possession thereof, for 
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Section 
57-3-3. Effect of failure to record. 
57-3-4. Certified copies entitled to record in an-
other county — Effect. 
57-3-5 to 57-3-9. Repealed. 
57-3-10. Legal description of real property and 
names and addresses required in instru-
ments. 
57-3-11. Original documents required — Captions 
— Legibility. 
57-3-1. Certificate of acknowledgment or of 
proof of execution a prerequisite. 
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any docu-
ment , or of the proof of the execution of any document 
tha t is signed and certified by the officer taking the 
acknowledgment as provided in this ti t le, entit les the 
document and the certificate to be recorded in the 
office of the recorder of the county where the real 
property is located. 1988 
57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Recordation 
not affected by change in interest rate 
— Validity of document not affected — 
Third person not charged with notice 
of unnamed interests — Conveyance 
free and clear of unrecorded interests. 
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and 
certified, in the manner prescribed by this title; each 
original document or certified copy of a document 
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not ac-
knowledged; and each financing statement complying 
with Section 10A-9-402, whether or not acknowl-
edged; shall, from the time of filing with the appropri-
ate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of 
their contents. 
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a 
change in the interest rate in accordance with the 
terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying 
secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter 
the priority of the document provided under Subsec-
tion (1). 
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a 
document with respect to the parties to the document 
and all other persons who have notice of the docu-
ment. 
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only 
a nominal consideration, names the grantee as 
trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without 
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust 
does not charge any third person with notice of any 
interest of the grantor or of the interest of any other 
person not named in the document. 
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may con-
vey the interest granted to him free and clear of all 
claims not disclosed in the document in which he ap-
pears as grantee or in any other document recorded in 
accordance with this title that sets forth the names of 
the beneficiaries, specifies the interest claimed, and 
describes the real property subject to the interest. 
19*8 
57-3-3. Effect of failure to record. 
Each document not recorded as provided in this ti-
tle is void as against any subsequent purchaser of the 
same real property, or any portion of it, if: 
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the 
property in good faith and for a valuable consid-
eration; and 
(2) the subsequent purchaser 's conveyance is 
first duly recorded. 1988 
57-3-4. Certified copies entitled to record in an-
other county — Effect. 
Whenever a document is of record in .the office of 
the county recorder of any county, a copy of the record 
of the document certified by the county recorder may 
be recorded in the office of the county recorder of any 
other county. The recording of a certified copy in the 
office of the county recorder of another county has the 
same force and effect as if the original document had 
been recorded in the other county. 1988 
57-3-5 to 57-3-9. Repealed. 1955.1963,1988 
57-3-10. Legal description of real property and 
n a m e s and addresses required in doc-
uments . 
(1) A document executed after Ju ly 1,1983, is enti-
tled to be recorded in the office of any county recorder 
only if the document contains a legal description of 
the real property affected. 
(2 > A document affecting title to real property pre-
sented for recording after July 1, 1981, is entitled to 
be recorded in the office of any county recorder only if 
the document contains the names and mail ing ad-
dresses of the grantees in addition to the legal de-
scription required under Subsection (1). 
(3) Each county recorder shall refuse to accept a 
document for recording if it does not conform to the 
requirements under this section. 1988 
57-3-11. Original documents required — Cap-
t ions — Legibility. 
Unless otherwise provided, documents presented 
for recording \r\ the office of the county recorder shal l 
be originals and shall contain a brief caption s ta t ing 
the na ture of the document. Documents presented for 
recording shall also be sufficiently legible for the re-
corder to make certified copies. 1988 
CHAPTER 4 
VALIDATING CERTAIN CONVEYANCES 
(Repealed by Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24.) 
57-4-1 to 57-4-4. Repealed. 
CHAPTER 4a 
EFFECTS OF RECORDING 
Section 
57-4a-l . Document recordable despite defects. 
57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of con-
tents despite defects. 
57-4a-3. Public document recordable without ac-
knowledgment. 
57-4a-4. Presumptions. 
57-4a-l. Document recordable despite defects. 
Each document executed and acknowledged on or 
before July 1, 1988, may be recorded in the office of 
the county recorder regardless of any defect or irregu-
larity in its execution, attestation, or acknowledg-
ment. 1988 
57-4a-2. Recorded document imparts notice of 
contents despite defects. 
A recorded document imparts notice of its contents 
regardless of any defect, irregularity, or omission in 
its execution, attestation, or acknowledgment. A cer-
tified copy of a recorded document is admissible as 
evidence to the same extent the original document 
would be admissible as evidence. 1988 
78-2-2 JUDICIAL CODE 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
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